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INTRODUCTION
The practice of promoting rule of law programs in foreign
countries has developed as a foreign policy subgenre. 1 These programs
generally pass for seemingly neutral, if not positive, endeavors,
“packaged” in the form of disinterested intent, as a matter of selfless
purport. Rule of law programs implicate members of the legal academy
and profession to cooperate with U.S. government agencies in an effort
to make global judicial systems conform to the precepts of American
legal values. That is, these programs propound the U.S. legal system as a
model for the world, or at least that part of the world deemed to be of
U.S. national interest.
This Article challenges the practice and practicability of these
programs. It argues that U.S. law reform projects, as conditions of
foreign aid, often serve to preempt the political discourse from
substantive debates about justice systems, frequently oversimplify the
problems that laws are intended to mediate, and, almost always, are
selective about the beneficiaries of legal reform. It argues that rule of law
programs are intended to influence the character of global governance
complementary to counter-insurgency operations, and designed to
promote U.S. interests often obtainable only by the very violation of the
notion of justice. 2
1
The phrase “rule of law programs” refers to efforts by U.S. entities, most often the U.S.
Department of State, USAID, and its contractors, to bring about institutional reforms in the
judiciaries and ministries of justice in foreign countries. See, e.g., Rule of Law Stabilization Program –
Formal Justice Sector Component, USAID, http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/factsheets/rule-law-stabilization-program-%E2%80%93-formal-justice-sector-component
(last
updated Oct. 1, 2013); USAID Rule of Law Program, Jordan 2008–2013, TETRA TECH DPK,

http://www.tetratechdpk.com/component/content/article/64-jordan/121-usaid-rule-of-lawprogram-.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2014); see also Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law
Abroad: The Problem of Knowledge 13 (Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy &
Rule
of
Law
Project,
Working
Paper
No.
34,
2003),
available
at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/wp34.pdf.
2 See Andrew Bacevich, Social Work with Guns, 31 LONDON REV. BOOKS 7, 7 (2009)
(describing the strategies of the war in Afghanistan); John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Law
and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction, in LAW AND DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 1,
25, 31 (John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff eds., 2006) (describing law as fetishism in response
to growing anxiety about increasing lawlessness in developing countries); see also Michelle D.
Bonner, Critical Debates, Law and Injustice in Latin America, 50 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 169
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These arguments are developed through an examination of the
current Mérida Initiative (also known as Plan México), a product of U.S.
policy efforts to shape the legal systems of select foreign countries. This
Article seeks to provide an alternative perspective to the way rule of law
programs have been depicted by the dominant rule of law policy
discourse. It also argues these programs cannot be assessed by
measuring the benefits of the accusatorial system against those of the
inquisitorial system, or whether oral trials are superior to written trials,
or even by considering whether the promotion of the presumption of
innocence is sufficient to validate such projects. Moreover, the manner
by which the United States has attempted to dominate legal reform
efforts has produced distrust and compromised the Mexican sense of
national sovereignty. 3
This is not to argue that rule of law programs lack the potential to
improve justice outcomes, of course. Under optimum circumstances,
rule of law programs can serve to inspire citizens to claim their legal
rights and protections, articulate their demands, and advance their goals
for an improved justice system. 4 But, it is also true that such efforts must
originate within the polity for whom judicial processes are designed to
serve. In order for legal rights to inspire confidence and obtain
credibility, citizens must determine the means and develop the
substance of systems of law in a manner consistent with their history
and political institutions.
This Article proceeds by examining the circumstances in Mexico as
they relate to U.S. efforts to export law and legal systems. Part I
describes the phenomenon of escalating drug-related violence in
Mexico, including the “hyperstitious” 5 narrative that characterizes the
media coverage of crime and victimization in Mexico. It reviews the
inability of the Mexican legal system to respond adequately to crime, a
concern that has been documented by Mexican and U.S. scholars and
jurists and, perhaps most notably, by social movements that have long
demanded accountability for crime and violence in Mexico. 6 Part I
concludes by chronicling the U.S. response to drug-related violence in
Mexico, and specifically its foreign aid plan known as the Mérida
(2008) (noting a focus on the rule of law as a means of addressing persistent violence in Latin
America).
3 See infra Part IV.
4 See Deborah M. Weissman, Gender and Human Rights: Between Morals and Politics, in
GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 409, 409–10 (Linda C.
McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009).
5 See Richard Seymour, The Uses of al-Qaida, in 34 LONDON REV. BOOKS 25, 25 (2012)
(using the term to describe a discursive quality of hype and over-reaching to justify U.S.
intervention throughout the Middle East).
6 See generally MAKING A KILLING: FEMICIDE, FREE TRADE, AND LA FRONTERA (Alicia
Gaspar de Alba & Georgina Guzmán eds., 2010); TERRORIZING WOMEN: FEMINICIDE IN THE
AMERICAS (Rosa-Linda Fregoso & Cynthia Bejarano eds., 2010).
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Initiative which, in addition to financing the militarization of the war on
drugs, serves to fund and direct the overhaul of Mexico’s legal system.
The Article next formulates a critical theoretical and pragmatic
framework within which to examine U.S. rule of law programs as a
foreign policy template. Part II considers the use of law as a political
instrument in a historical context with a focus on long-standing U.S.
efforts to reform legal systems, and specifically, the persistence of flawed
practices that appear to have little effect on current initiatives. It reviews
the flawed efforts to transplant programs in Latin America that have
nonetheless failed to inform current initiatives.
Part III builds upon long-standing questions concerning the
efficacy of exporting legal systems. 7 It then considers foundational
differences between U.S. and Mexican legal systems and argues that the
Mérida Initiative rule of law program is ill-matched with Mexico’s legal
culture, if not in conflict with many of Mexico’s current reform efforts. 8
Part IV examines the relationship between rule of law programs
and national sovereignty. Efforts to transplant legal systems that
impinge on the prerogative of the nation have been viewed with
suspicion and may well undermine Mexican law reform efforts and
produce baneful outcomes. Part V appraises the Mérida rule of law
program as a technocratic undertaking that acts to reduce the
formulation of justice to bureaucratic procedures and lawyers as
technicians. What appears to the casual observer to be an ideology-free
commitment is, in fact, driven by a normative system that in a Mexican
context may well serve to stifle public debate about the merits and
motivation of rule of law programs. Obscured too are the social
consequences of misguided efforts to remake the Mexican judicial
system serve in function of U.S national interests.
I. DRUG VIOLENCE, IMPUNITY, AND THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE’S RULE OF
LAW PROGRAM: CREATING A “CULTURE OF LAWFULNESS” IN MEXICO 9
Violence in Mexico has become an issue of global concern.
Newspapers offer daily descriptions of horrific crimes that have been
committed: decapitations, charred bodies, and corpses in barrels of lye. 10
7 The word “transplant” is used to reflect the imposition of legal changes and is
distinguished from the term “legal translation.” Holning Lau, The Language of Westernization
in Legal Commentary, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 523 (2013); see Jorge L. Esquirol, The Turn to
Legal Interpretation in Latin America, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1031, 1035 (2011) (describing a
transnational legal discourse in Latin America).
8 See infra Part III.
9 EMBASSY OF THE U.S. IN MEX., FACT SHEET: CULTURE OF LAWFULNESS (2013), available
at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/nov-2013/COL-factsheet-Nov-2013-eng.pdf.
10 Marc Lacey, With Deadly Persistence, Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2009, at A1; Richard Marosi, Mexico Under Siege: A City Goes Silent at His Name, L.A.
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These gruesome acts have been attributed to a war between different
drug cartels, the government’s response to drug cartel violence, and a
consequence of government corruption and impunity. Drug trafficking,
which generates billions of dollars annually, comprises an increasingly
significant part of the Mexican economy upon which many farmers
depend for their livelihood and is a source of employment in
transportation, banking, and security. 11
An analysis of the drug war dynamics raises a number of concerns,
both historical and current, from the local to the transnational, some
overlapping and others seemingly unrelated. Drug trafficking is a
function of agricultural shifts, geography, proximity to the United
States, and the increasing ease with which transnational crime is
facilitated in an era of globalization. 12 Without an understanding of the
political economic determinants of Mexico’s drug-related violence, it is
unlikely that prevailing commentary can provide meaningful
information or that law-related reform initiatives can improve the
circumstances.
A.

Drug Violence in Context

It would be impractical to attempt to review the multiple and
multivariable determinants that give rise to Mexico’s violence. The
following discussion offers a summary of the dynamics most frequently
identified as contributors to Mexico’s drug cartel violence.
1.

NAFTA and Free Trade: Easy Recruits for Drug Cartels

Much has been written on the adverse effect of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 13 upon Mexico’s domestic economy. 14
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at 1; James C. McKinley, Jr., Mexican Investigator of American’s Killing Is
Beheaded, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, at A29.
11 See Charles Bowden on Mexico’s Dirty War Against Drugs, DEMOCRACY NOW (Aug. 11,
2009),
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/8/11/charles_bowden_on_mexicos_dirty_war
(estimating that Mexico earns $30 billion to $50 billion a year from selling drugs); Ami C.
Carpenter, Beyond Drug Wars: Transforming Factional Conflict in Mexico, 27 CONFLICT RESOL.
Q. 401, 407 (2010) (stating that the drug trade brings in $23 billion in revenue annually or
twenty percent of Mexico’s GDP).
12 See Betty Horwitz, The Role of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
(CICAD): Confronting the Problem of Illegal Drugs in the Americas, 52 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y
139, 140 (2010).
13 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), available at https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&
language=en-US.
14 KEVIN P. GALLAGHER ET AL., BOSTON UNIV., THE FUTURE OF NORTH AMERICAN TRADE
POLICY: LESSONS FROM NAFTA 3 (2009), available at http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2009/11/
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The enactment of NAFTA slowed the Mexican economy, caused wages
to remain low and real wages to decline, and has harmed the
environment—all measures that demonstrate, with regard to basic
human needs, Mexicans may well be worse off now than before the
treaty. 15 Mexico has had the slowest growth rate of any Latin American
country. 16 Subsidized and tax-free products flooding Mexican markets
from the United States have caused the “hollow[ing] out” of Mexico’s
domestic economy. 17 Funding for infrastructure, services, and schools
diminished. 18 Staple items in the Mexican diet have quadrupled in
price. 19
NAFTA also contributed to rising inequality and extreme poverty,
and drug cartels exploit these circumstances. 20 As one study has noted,
“[f]or the cartels, this huge pool of the poor serves as a recruiting
ground for foot soldiers in a war that’s growing more deadly every
month.” 21 Further:
[w]hile the narcotraficantes use violence to silence those who oppose
them, they also use the proceeds from the drug trade to cultivate a
loyal following among the poor and disaffected. The Gulf Cartel
donates food, bicycles, clothing, and toys to Nuevo Laredo residents,
and drug kingpins throw festivals for the residents of their
strongholds. In many cases, these overtures find a receptive
audience. 22

Pardee-Report-NAFTA.pdf (NAFTA “decimat[ed] many existing sources of livelihood” in
Mexico.); Jeff Faux, NAFTA at 10, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 9, 2004), http://www.epi.org/
publication/webfeatures_viewpoints_nafta_legacy_at10/ (describing across the board economic
hardship in Mexico as a consequence of NAFTA).
15 JOHN J. AUDLEY ET AL., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, NAFTA’S PROMISE
AND REALITY 6 (2004), available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/nafta1.pdf;
EDUARDO ZEPEDA ET AL., CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, RETHINKING TRADE
POLICY FOR DEVELOPMENT: LESSONS FROM MEXICO UNDER NAFTA 5 (2009), available at
http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/12/07/rethinking-trade-policy-for-development-lessonsfrom-mexico-under-nafta/2uli.
16 ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 15, at 1.
17 GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 14, at 30; ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 15, at 10 (noting that
the Mexican economy shrunk by about seven percent); see also Alejandro Nadal,
Macroeconomic Challenges for Mexico’s Development Strategy, in CONFRONTING
DEVELOPMENT: ASSESSING MEXICO’S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY CHALLENGES 62 (Kevin J.
Middlebrook & Eduardo Zepeda eds., 2003).
18 ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 15, at 15.
19 See Gary Prevost & Robert Weber, The Prospects for the Free Trade Area of the Americas
in the Bush Administration, in NEOLIBERALISM AND NEOPANAMERICANISM: THE VIEW FROM
LATIN AMERICA 67, 71 (Gary Prevost & Carlos Oliva Campos eds., 2002).
20 ZEPEDA ET AL., supra note 15, at 15.
21 Jason Beaubien, As Drug War Turns into Quagmire, Fear Rules Mexico, NPR (Aug. 2,
2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=128804488.
22 HAL BRANDS, MEXICO’S NARCO-INSURGENCY AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG POLICY 19
(2009), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a499142.pdf.
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To complicate matters further, over two million people have lost the
ability to survive through traditional farming and agriculture; many
have turned to drug crops in order to survive. 23 The weakening of
Mexico’s economy has diminished the capacity of the state to respond to
its current crisis. Privatization of once state-owned businesses and the
deregulation of the banking system have made it easier for drug cartels
to launder their drug profits. 24 As one priest working in Mexico’s
prisons noted while referring to one of the most notorious drug cartels,
“[i]f the economy worked for the common good, there would be no
Zetas.” 25
While some studies show the Mexican export economy is
rebounding, it has far to go before Mexicans experience relief. 26 Mexico
suffered the worst economic recession of all of Latin America following
the global economic crisis of 2009. 27 According to the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it had one of the
highest levels of inequality and poverty of any OECD evaluated nation.28
These conditions suggest ongoing difficulties in the effort to eradicate
drug violence.
2.

Guns Go South, Drugs Go North

Drug violence in Mexico is not entirely homegrown. U.S. policies
with regard to gun sales and drugs are inextricably linked with cartel
violence and contribute to the difficulty in bringing about an end to
lawlessness and corruption. U.N. reports, investigations by the U.S.
government agencies, and media inquiries have determined many of the
weapons used by cartels originated in the United States, especially in
border states such as Arizona, said to have “weakest gun violence
prevention laws.” 29 According to the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco
23 GALLAGHER ET AL., supra note 14, at 35–36; J. Patrick Larue, The “ILL-ICIT” Effects of
NAFTA: Increased Drug Trafficking into the United States Through the Southwest Border, 9
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 38, 45 n.144 (2000) (noting that farmers have resorted to growing
illicit cannabis and poppy crops).
24 PETER ANDREAS, BORDER GAMES: POLICING THE U.S.-MEXICO DIVIDE 23 (2000).
25 Damien Cave, Salvation Army of One, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2013, at MM30 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
26 M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-MEXICO ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
TRENDS, ISSUES, AND IMPLICATIONS 13 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL32934.pdf.
27 Id.
28 OECD Environmental Performance Reviews: Mexico 2013, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/env/country-reviews/mexico2013.htm (last visited
Mar. 11, 2014).
29 Katherine Eban, The Truth About Fast and Furious, CNNMONEY (June 27, 2012, 5:00
AM),
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/27/fast-and-furious-truth
(internal
quotation marks omitted); see also UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE
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and Firearms and Explosives (ATF), “[b]y 2009 the Sinaloa drug cartel
had made Phoenix its gun supermarket and recruited young Americans
as its designated shoppers or straw purchasers.” 30 Some not old enough
to buy alcohol “were plunking down as much as $20,000 in cash to
purchase up to 20 semiautomatics at a time, and then delivering the
weapons to others.” 31
Since 2006, Mexican authorities have confiscated over 60,000
weapons from drug cartels purchased from U.S. gun dealers. 32 The
Inspector General’s investigation of the ATF scandal known as
“Operation Fast and Furious” revealed, as a result of “a dysfunctional
and poorly supervised group of Arizona-based federal prosecutors and
[ATF] agents,” hundreds of U.S. weapons passed into the hands of
Mexican drug gangs. 33 Operation Fast and Furious was not the first illfated program designed to traffic weapons into Mexico as a sting
operation. In 2006 and 2007, a program called “Wide Receiver” similarly
failed to track weapons and resulted in an unknown number of guns
falling into the hands of Mexican cartels, 34 some of which emerged from
a group of elite U.S. trained Mexican soldiers to fight insurgents in Latin
America. 35 In addition, U.S. Border Patrol and a mayor of a town in
New Mexico have been implicated in smuggling illegal guns to Mexican
cartels. 36
GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 133–
39 (2010), available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tocta-2010.html
(reporting that about 20,000 firearms enter Mexico from the United States every year); Ed
Payne, Many Weapons Used by Mexican Drug Gangs Originate in U.S., CNN (June 14, 2011,
1:32 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/06/14/mexico.guns/index.html (describing a report
that found that more than seventy percent of firearms submitted to the ATF from Mexico for
tracing originated in the United States); Richard A. Serrano, Fast and Furious Gun Found After
Cartel Shootout, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012, at 14 (reporting that about 2000 weapons lost under
the U.S. gun program known as “Fast and Furious” now flow freely across the U.S.-Mexico
border); Pete Yost, ATF Says 68,000 Guns Seized in Mexico Traced Back to U.S., WASH. POST,
Apr. 27, 2012, at A14 (stating that at least 68,000 guns in the past five years have been traced
back to the United States).
30 Eban, supra note 29.
31 Id.
32 James V. Grimaldi & Sari Horwitz, Mexican Cartels Wielding American Weapons, WASH.
POST, Dec. 13, 2010, at A01. See generally Eban, supra note 29; Katie Soltis, Mexican Drug
Violence Fueled by U.S. Guns, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (June 27, 2011),
http://www.coha.org/mexican-drug-violence-fueled-by-u-s-guns/#more-13110.
33 Charlie Savage, Justice Inquiry Faults Its Own in Gun Fiasco, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2012,
at A1.
34 Serrano, supra note 29.
35 Enrique Krauze, Mexico at War, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 27, 2012, at 66, 68 (describing
the origins of the Zetas, known to be one of the most vicious cartels of all); Serrano, supra note
29.

36 Aaron Bracamontes, Ex-Border Patrol Agent Gets 4 Years in Gun Smuggling Case, EL PASO
TIMES (Nov. 30, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.elpasotimes.com/tablehome/ci_22089977/formerborder-patrol-agent-gets-4-years-gun; Mayor of N.M. Town Pleads Guilty to Gun Smuggling, USA
TODAY (July 13, 2011, 11:47 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-07-13-newmexico-town-mayor-gun-smuggling-mexico_n.htm.
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U.S. drug policies further contribute to drug violence in Mexico.
Demand in the United States provides much of the stimulus for
Mexico’s drug wars. As one noted journalist has explained:
Drugs are an old business in Mexico. Farmers in the remote high
sierra of the western state of Sinaloa have been growing opium
poppies since the late 19th century—and marijuana long before
that—but smuggling did not become a viable enterprise until the US
created an illicit market by regulating the use of opiates in 1914.
Then, as now, drugs flowed one way: north. 37

Mexicans also use illicit drugs, and more so in recent years. 38
However, illegal drug use in Latin America, including those countries
that produce drugs, is notably less than in the United States. 39 Mexico’s
response to drug use is largely a function of the heavy hand of U.S. drug
policy, particularly since the 1970s when President Richard Nixon first
declared the “War on Drugs”—a declaration with extraterritorial
reach. 40 The U.S. government succeeded in pressuring Mexico to rely on
its military apparatus to curtail drug trafficking notwithstanding the
widespread knowledge that Mexico’s federal troops were guilty of
committing heinous human rights abuses. 41
The United States persists in imposing its supply-side interdiction
policies through a combination of aid conditions and other certification
and assistance programs, notwithstanding the demonstrable
ineffectiveness of such an approach. 42 At the same time, U.S. authorities
have been lax in programs designed to reduce domestic drug demand
which experts have noted to be “a far more effective and humane
strategy than any supply-reduction approach.” 43 In sum, the U.S.
prohibitionist approach to drugs contributes to violence in Mexico
37 Ben Ehrenreich, A Lucrative War, 32 LONDON REV. BOOKS 15 (2010); see also Pamela F.
Izaguirre, Narco-Politics: How Mexico Got There and How It Can Get Out, COUNCIL ON
HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.coha.org/narco-politics-how-mexico-got-thereand-how-it-can-get-out (describing the history of the production of illicit cash crops in Mexico
as a function of U.S. demand after World War II).
38 HOWARD CAMPBELL, DRUG WAR ZONE: FRONTLINE DISPATCHES FROM THE STREETS OF
EL PASO AND JUÁREZ 97 (2009).
39 Horace A. Bartilow & Kihong Eom, Free Traders and Drug Smugglers: The Effects of
Trade Openness on States’ Ability to Combat Drug Trafficking, 51 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 117,
123–24 (2008) (citing the UN World Drug Report 2006).
40 Ehrenreich, supra note 37, at 15. For a discussion of Mexico’s efforts to change course
and consider legalization and public health approaches to illicit drugs, see infra Part III.B.4.
41 Ehrenreich, supra note 37, at 15. The United States declined to cooperate in a
hemispheric coalition-building approach to address drug trafficking in order to avoid providing
a platform for leaders like Hugo Chavez. See Horwitz, supra note 12, at 140.
42 Kal Raustiala, Law, Liberalization & International Narcotics Trafficking, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 89, 142 (1999).
43 LISA HAUGAARD ET AL., A CAUTIONARY TALE: PLAN COLOMBIA’S LESSONS FOR U.S.
POLICY TOWARD MEXICO AND BEYOND 2, 14 (2011), available at http://www.wola.org/sites/
default/files/downloadable/Cautionary_Tale.pdf.
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while failing to curb the demand for the trafficking of illicit substances
across the border.
3.

Mexico’s Contemporary Political History

A number of scholars have argued that the escalation in violence is
a consequence of the waning of the power of the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI), the Mexican political party that ruled between 1929
and 2000. 44 During its reign, the PRI leadership entered into
negotiations with cartels and permitted them to conduct their illegal
activities in exchange for a share of profits and assurances from the
cartels to limit the violence committed in the course of their
transactions. 45 Because of these arrangements, the PRI maintained a
type of quid pro quo arrangement that accepted violence as long as it
was largely contained among the cartels. 46 As a result, law enforcement
agencies were weakened as corruption spread into all levels of
institutional operations. 47 At the end of the PRI’s rule, no mechanisms
existed to curb the violence and maintain “equilibrium.”
President Felipe Calderón, the candidate of the Partido Acción
Nacional (PAN), assumed office in 2006 after a close and hotly
contested election. 48 He immediately launched a war on the cartels upon
taking office. 49 Critics charged that Calderón’s initiative against the
cartels was an effort to gain “a legitimacy that he did not receive in the
voting booth” and demonstrate the ability of his government to lead.50
The declaration of war against the cartels transformed the character of
44 CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 24; GEORGE W. GRAYSON, MEXICO: NARCO-VIOLENCE AND
FAILED STATE? 2 (2010) (providing PRI’s English translation as the “Institutional
Revolutionary Party”); Carpenter, supra note 11, at 407, 410; John L. Garcia, PRI Begins Its
Ascent to Power as a Perplexed U.S. Looks for Formula to Bring Down Mexican Drug Syndicates,
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.coha.org/pri-began-its-ascent-topower-as-u-s-looks-for-formula-to-bring-down-mexican-drug-syndicates.
Most
recently,
Enrique Peña Nieto, a PRI candidate was successful in his bid for the presidency of Mexico and
the PRI assumed political leadership of the executive as of 2013. Damien Cave, Narrow Victory
for Mexico’s New Leader Signals Bigger Challenges Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2012, at A4.
45 Garcia, supra note 44.
46 CAMPBELL, supra note 38, at 24; GRAYSON, supra note 44, at 2.
47 Carpenter, supra note 11, at 404 (noting that the cartels were dependent on government
officials and police for protection); Garcia, supra note 44.
48 Miguel Tinker Salas, Mexico Drug War Losing Proposition for All of Us, PROGRESSIVE
MEDIA PROJECT (Apr. 1, 2010), http://progressivemediaproject.org/mplovel040110.html.
49 Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug Violence and Adversarial Experiments, 35 N.C. J. INT’L
L. & COM. REG. 363, 365–66 (2010) (commenting on reports of voter irregularities); Dan
Boscov-Ellen, La Pesadilla de Prohibición—Drug Policy and Violence in Mexico, COUNCIL ON
HEMISPHERIC AFF. (June 23, 2010), http://www.coha.org/la-pesadilla-de-prohibicion%E2%80%93-drug-policy-and-violence-in-mexico.
50 Luis Hernandez Navarro, A War on Drugs? No, It Is a War on the Mexican People, THE
GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2010, at 26.
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the drug trade in Mexico. Cartels moved from engaged battle with each
other for territory and control of a lucrative and illicit transnational
enterprise to a war to destabilize a government that had changed the
rules of the relationship. 51
With the election of Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012, the PRI has once
again assumed political leadership, although by a smaller margin than
previous elections. 52 While disavowing the PRI’s historic pacts with the
cartels, Peña Nieto has committed to continuing Calderón’s military
approach against drug cartels—an approach which is likely to continue
to produce violence. 53
B.

The Mexican Legal System’s Failure to Respond

During the last two decades, the Mexican judicial system has come
under domestic and international scrutiny and criticism for its inability
to adequately respond to crime and violence. 54 The absence of legal
rights and accountability has been identified as a fundamental cause of
the murders and has resulted in a climate of impunity. 55 Crime victims
have little trust in law enforcement agencies and are reluctant to report
crime. 56 Human rights groups have criticized Mexico’s failure to provide
justice to victims of violent crimes and human rights violations. 57
Defendants, too, suffer the denial of any semblance of due process; they
are snatched off the streets by police without warrants and are
subsequently subjected to a variety of abuses. 58 Mexican courts have
been described as weak, and malfeasance has plagued judicial
51 Carpenter, supra note 11, at 411 (noting the use of “shock and awe” tactics used to
undermine confidence in the government).
52 Cave, supra note 44.
53 Id. But see Randal C. Archibold et al., New Friction as Mexico Curbs U.S. Cooperation in
Drug Wars, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, at A1 (describing the message sent by Mexico’s President
Peña Nieto about changes to the nature of the relationship between the United States and
Mexico regarding the war on drugs).
54 Deborah M. Weissman, The Political Economy of Violence: Toward an Understanding of
the Gender-Based Murders of Ciudad Juárez, 30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 795, 808 (2005)
(reviewing the failure of the Mexican legal system to respond to the murders of women in
Ciudad Juárez). The Mexican judiciary is deemed to be far weaker than the other branches of
government. See MATTHEW C. INGRAM ET AL., ASSESSING MEXICO’S JUDICIAL REFORM 4 (2012),
available at http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/tbi-assessing-judicial-reform
1.pdf.
55 AMNESTY INT’L, MEXICO: INTOLERABLE KILLINGS: 10 YEARS OF ABDUCTIONS AND
MURDERS OF WOMEN IN CIUDAD JUÁREZ AND CHIHUAHUA: SUMMARY REPORT AND APPEALS
CASES (2003), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/027/2003/en/
e81827cb-d6b3-11dd-ab95-a13b602c0642/amr410272003en.pdf.
56 JO TUCKMAN, MEXICO: DEMOCRACY INTERRUPTED 108 (2012) (Over eighty percent of
crime victims consider it a “waste of time” to report the crime to authorities.).
57 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Mexico, in WORLD REPORT 191 (2009), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2009_web.pdf.
58 TUCKMAN, supra note 56, at 109 (noting concerns about incarceration of the innocent).
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processes. 59 The presumption of innocence exists in theory but is given
little practical consideration. 60 Judges accept as evidence confessions
elicited through torture and other mistreatment. 61 Courts often function
as “rubber-stamp[s]” for prosecutors who routinely abuse their
authority. 62
The Mexican judicial system suffers from corruption and
insufficient resources. 63 Human rights activists have demonstrated
impunity reigns; military officers often are accused of human rights
violations. 64 Penitentiaries have been described as “the true universities
of crime.” 65 Indeed, as the Mexican documentary, Presumed Guilty
(Presunto Culpable), filmed by two Mexican lawyers, has chronicled,
many Mexicans are more fearful of the criminal justice system than
crime itself. 66
C.

The United States’ Response: Exporting Law

Accounts of the threats posed by drug cartel violence, fear of the
loss of control of the U.S.-Mexico border, and the inability of the
Mexican judicial system to respond have developed into the dominant
narrative of Mexico, and have resulted in a number of responses from
the United States. 67 Primary among them has been the Mérida Initiative,
a legislative plan designed to develop a heightened military response to
Mexico’s drug wars. 68 The State Department initially identified the
Weissman, supra note 54, at 848.
EMILY EDMONDS-POLI & DAVID A. SHIRK, CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN POLITICS 269 (2d
ed. 2012); TUCKMAN, supra note 56, at 109.
61 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 191 (noting that when torture is revealed, the
justice system has systematically failed to investigate or prosecute such acts); Elisabeth Malkin,
Mexico: Torture Reports Triple, Group Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/world/americas/mexico-torture-reports-triple-groupfinds.html?ref=world.
62 Julio Ríos-Figueroa, Sociolegal Studies on Mexico, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 312
(2012).
63 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57, at 191.
64 Human Rights in Mexico: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Tom Lantos
Human Rights Commission, 112th Cong. 9 (2012) (statement of Santiago Aguirre, Att’y,
Tlachinollan Human Rights Center), available at http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/
2012_5_10_Human_Rights_In_Mexico/Santiago_Aguirre_Testimony.pdf
(testifying
that
impunity results because the army investigates itself and military courts maintain jurisdiction
over these claims).
65 Krauze, supra note 35, at 69.
66 PRESUMED GUILTY (Lawyers with Camera 2010).
67 Ginger Thompson, U.S. Bolsters Security at Mexican Border, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009,
at A10 (noting that according to a government spokesman, the relationship between the United
States and Mexico has received “‘sustained, high-level, comprehensive attention’” related to
fears of an explosion of crime across the border).
68 Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-252, § 1406, 122 Stat. 2323, 2339–40.
59
60
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plan’s four primary goals: 1) break the power and impunity of criminal
organizations; 2) assist in strengthening border, air, and maritime
controls; 3) improve the capacity of justice systems; and 4) curtail gang
activity and diminish the demand for drugs in the region. 69 In 2009,
after front-loading most of the funds to pay for military equipment to
intensify the war on drugs cartels, the Obama administration issued a
revised set of goals that attempted to de-emphasize the escalation of a
military response and instead draw attention to U.S. plans to help
Mexico build civil society institutions and judicial systems. Phase II,
known as Beyond Mérida, called for developing a “culture of lawfulness”
by focusing greater attention to the task of reforming Mexico’s legal
system. 70 In 2010, the United States reaffirmed its intention to
institutionalize the rule of law in Mexico by strengthening Mexican law
enforcement capabilities and judicial institutions. 71 Some have
welcomed the discursive shift from a policy that emphasized military
escalation as the priority for Mérida funding to “building the rule of
law” as a positive change in the approach to the problem of drug-related
violence. 72 Others have been skeptical. 73
The Mérida Initiative rule of law program has been administered
primarily by the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) and the Department of Justice as part of a larger ongoing plan

69 BUREAU OF INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, Counternarcotics and Law
Enforcement Country Program: Mexico, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Jan. 20, 2009),
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/fs/114078.htm. Although this Article focuses on the Mérida
Initiative’s rule of law program, it is important to note the criticisms of the U.S. decision to
fund the Mexican military. See, e.g., Boscov-Ellen, supra note 49.
70 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MÉRIDA INITIATIVE: THE UNITED STATES HAS
PROVIDED COUNTERNARCOTICS AND ANTICRIME SUPPORT BUT NEEDS BETTER PERFORMANCE
MEASURES 6 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10837.pdf.
71 CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE & KRISTIN M. FINKLEA, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., U.S.MEXICAN SECURITY COOPERATION: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE AND BEYOND 2, 21 (2011),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/171385.pdf.
72 Human Rights in Mexico: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, Tom Lantos
Human Rights Commission, 112th Cong. 9 (2012) (statement of Maureen Meyer, Senior Assoc.,
Wash. Office on Latin Am. on Human Rights in Mexico), available at http://www.wola.org/
sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/2012/MMeyer%20testimony%20TLHRC.pdf (urging
continued U.S. support for the rule of project).
73 Isaac Campos, In Search of Real Reform: Lessons from Mexico’s Long History of Drug
Prohibition, NACLA REP. AM., May/June 2011, at 14 (referring to drug violence as “drug-policy
related violence” due to the evidence that criminalization policies and enhanced law
enforcement strategies have contributed to escalating violence); see GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG
POL’Y, WAR ON DRUGS: REPORT OF THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON DRUG POLICY 5, 15 (2011),
available
at
http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/themes/gcdp_v1/pdf/
Global_Commission_Report_English.pdf (reviewing evidence indicating that criminalization
strategies to respond to drug violence often exacerbate the problem). But see Damien Cave &
Michael S. Schmidt, Rise in Pill Abuse Forces New Look at U.S. Drug Fight, N.Y. TIMES, July 17,
2012, at A1 (noting, however, that a shift from funding for military equipment to “institutionbuilding” was not likely to change soon).
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related to reforming Mexico’s legal system. 74 In collaboration with the
State Department, USAID has contracted with private firms, most
notably Management Information Systems (MSI) and Management
Sciences for Development, Inc. (MSD), both international development
firms based in Washington, D.C. 75 These firms have drafted, promoted,
and managed the processes for comprehensive revisions of Mexico’s
constitution specifically as it relates to criminal justice, seizure laws, as
well as federal and state criminal procedure codes. 76
The Mérida plan authorizes USAID to recruit and train members
of the federal police, judges, prosecutors, and public defenders at both
the federal and state levels. 77 The plan also directs the U.S. Department
of Justice to administer millions of dollars of State Department and
USAID funding to improve prosecutorial capacity, increase the internal
control systems within the Mexican federal police and the Mexican
74 MGMT. SYS. INT’L, MEXICO RULE OF LAW STRENGTHENING: FINAL REPORT TO USAID
JULY 6, 2004 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, at 4 (2007), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PDACO092.pdf (noting that in 2003, “USAID decided to implement its Rule of Law Project in
Mexico”). USAID has described the work it undertook with MSI/Proderecho including the
drafting of the revised criminal code and constitutional amendments. USAID with
MSI/Proderecho also created a network to support constitutional reforms, helped to draft and
pay for television scripts to promote the amendments, and made press statements on behalf of
the network. Id. at 8, 28, 31, 48, 154; see MGMT. SCIS. FOR DEV., INC., RULE OF LAW PROJECT:
MEXICO 2ND QUARTER REPORT FY 2009 JANUARY 1ST–MARCH 31ST, 2009, at 2 (2009), available
at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACO420.pdf (noting that reform efforts are focused on
Mexico’s criminal justice system); Letter from Jess. T. Ford, Assoc. Dir., Int’l Relations & Trade
Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Cong. Requesters on Foreign Assistance: Status of Rule
of Law Program Coordination 3 (Oct. 13, 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/
89353.pdf; Weissman, supra note 54, at 849–56 (reviewing U.S. directed changes to Mexican
national law primarily as a function of global economics and NAFTA); see also U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 70, at 13; Rule of Law, U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV. (Jan.
10, 2014), http://transition.usaid.gov/mx/ruleoflaweng.html.
75 About MSI, MGMT. SYS. INT’L, http://www.msiworldwide.com/wp-content/uploads/
MSI_one_page_eng.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Brigitte Claney, Coffey International
Limited Awarded USD $66.3 Million USAID Rule of Law Project in Mexico, COFFEY (July 3,
2009), http://www.coffey.com/our-news/media-releases/coffey-international-limited-awardedusd-66-3-million-usaid-rule-of-law-project-in-mexico (noting in a press release that
MSI/Proderecho first worked on the passage of Mexican judicial reforms, and was now
awarded a contract to implement these judicial reforms under the Mérida Initiative); MGMT.
SCI. FOR DEV., http://www.msdglobal.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Strengthening Justice
Systems in Mexico, MGMT. SYS. INT’L, http://www.msiworldwide.com/project/strengtheningjustice-systems-in-mexico (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). MSD was also responsible for USAID
Rule of Law programs as part of Plan Colombia. NANCY GARCÍA TAFOYA, MGMT. SCIS. FOR
DEV., INC., PRODERECHO END OF YEAR REPORT FY 2008 (2008), available at
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACM744.pdf.
76 See MGMT. SYS. INT’L, supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also MSD/PRODERECHO,
QUARTERLY REPORT JANUARY 1–MARCH 31, 2008, at 1 (2008), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/
pdf_docs/PDACO077.pdf; SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 21; WILSON CTR., MEXICO
INST., GROUP III—INSTITUTION BUILDING AND RULE OF LAW (2008), available at
http://mexicoinstitute.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/merida-initiative-part2.pdf.
77 SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 22, 24; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
STATUS OF FUNDS FOR THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 5, 14, 22, 24 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10253r.pdf.
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Attorney General’s Office, improve extradition processes, enhance
sentencing and other related criminal penalties, and assure Mexico’s
ability to securely detain criminals. 78 The International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs Agency has also been allocated Mérida funds
to develop a “culture of lawfulness” in Mexico. 79
As an integral part of the Mérida Initiative, U.S. prosecutors, as
well as U.S. law schools, have developed programs to instruct their
Mexican counterparts to conduct “American-style” criminal trials. 80
Funds have been allocated to develop mock courtrooms, virtual
classrooms, and courseware development. 81 Curiously, the U.S. project
has not attempted to reintroduce jury trials although Mexican citizens
have a history of participation in the legal system via juries. 82 The plan
also calls for the training of non-government organizations and civil
society groups about criminal procedures, protection of rights, and
alternative case resolution programs. 83 In a statement before a
Congressional subcommittee, the Director of the USAID Mission to
Mexico described the Mérida Initiative rule of law program as a way to
assist Mexicans to “fundamentally change their entire justice system.” 84
78 SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 24; David T. Johnson, The Mérida Initiative: A New
Security Cooperation Partnership, 18 NAT’L STRATEGY FORUM REV. (2009), available at
http://www.nationalstrategy.com/NSFReview/Fall2009Vol18Issue3USMexico/LeadArticle
3.aspx.
79 EMBASSY OF THE U.S. IN MEXICO, supra note 9.
80 Wright, supra note 49, at 363, 381 (noting that a shift to an “accusatorial” system in
Mexico was deemed appropriate by U.S. funders); see, e.g., Jerry Crimmins, School Helps
Mexico Change Trial Process, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.globaltort.com/
2009/08/differences-in-legal-systems-mexico-and-the-us-on-criminal-law (describing ChicagoKent Law School’s involvement in reforming Mexico’s “ancient” criminal trial processes); see
also HIGHER EDUC. FOR DEV., U.S.-MEXICO TRAINING, INTERNSHIPS, EXCHANGES, AND
SCHOLARSHIP INITIATIVES (TIES): A MODEL FOR SUCCESS (2009), available at
http://www.hedprogram.org/resources/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=3309;
James E. Moliterno, Exporting American Legal Ethics, 43 AKRON L. REV. 769 (2010) (describing
USAID funded ABA law school programs); Randal C. Archibold, Mexican Prosecutors Train in
U.S. for Changes in Their Legal System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2009, at A12 .
81 See U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO, FACT SHEET: THE MÉRIDA INITIATIVE-MAJOR DELIVERIES
IN 2011 (2012), available at http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/23jan12/2011%20
Major%20Deliveries_2012.pdf; Karla Zabludovsky, In Mexico, Rehearsing to Inject Drama into
the Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2012, at A7.
82 See Hiroshi Fukurai & Richard Krooth, The Establishment of All-Citizen Juries as a Key
Component of Mexico’s Judicial Reform: Cross-National Analyses of Lay Judge Participation and
the Search for Mexico’s Judicial Sovereignty, 16 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 40 (2010). The
author’s review of all USAID reports, USAID statements, contractor reports, and GAO and
Office of Inspector General reports on the Mérida Initiative Rule of Law project finds that they
omit any reference to training or otherwise introducing anything related to jury trials.
83 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 77, at 22.
84 USAID/Mexico’s Role in the Mérida Initiative: Hearing Before H. Comm. on
Appropriations, S. Comm. on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 111th Cong.
(2009) (statement of Roger D. Garner, USAID Mission Dir. to Mexico), available at
http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/congressional-testimony/statement-usaid-missiondirector-mexico-rodger-d-garner.
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To that end, the Mérida Initiative seeks to redesign the very
infrastructure of the administration of justice. Funds have been
appropriated for case-tracking software, forensic laboratories, and
related training for court system personnel and law enforcement. 85
Appropriations have been made, in the words of the Department of
State, to “activate” new prisons; U.S. funds have been earmarked to
increase the number of federal correctional facilities in Mexico from six
to twenty-two and to improve the ability of the prison system to
“manage violent, disruptive offenders.”86 Funds have also been allocated
to enhance monitoring and interdiction activities, to revamp crime
scene management, and to purchase and administer drug test kits. 87
USAID appropriations have been used to acquire biometric equipment
in order to “capture and store the identification of criminal offenders,”
for the creation of new units to track gang activities, and to develop
classification systems of inmates. 88 Additional rule of law monies have
been designated to the Mexican Intelligence Service for the purpose of
investigation, surveillance, and counter-terrorism. 89 The largest
allocations have gone to International Narcotics Control and Law
Enforcement and Foreign Military Financing. 90 Other than General
Accounting Office (GAO) and Inspector General Reports, overall
monitoring and evaluation of the rule of law funding is controlled by
USAID. 91
II. LAW AS A POLITICAL INSTRUMENT: THEN AND NOW
For more than four decades, legal scholars have been analyzing the
relationship between rule of law programs such as the Mérida Initiative

85 ERIC OLSON, WILSON CTR., SIX KEY ISSUES IN U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION
(2008), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/six_issues_usmex_security_
coop.pdf; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 77, at 22.
86 Mérida Initiative at a Glance: Law Enforcement Achievements, U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO,
http://www.usembassy-mexico.gov/eng/merida/emerida_factsheet_lawenforcement.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2014).
87 Id.
88 U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO, supra note 81.
89 Laura Carlsen, A Primer on Plan Mexico, AMS. PROGRAM (May 5, 2008),
http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1474.
90 THOMAS H. ISOM, PRI AND THE BEYOND MÉRIDA INITIATIVE 2 (2011), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA555293 (report submitted by student, a
Colonel in the U.S. Navy, at the Naval War College).
91 See HUGO CONCHA, WHERE THINGS STAND IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM IN
MEXICO 11 (2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/hugo_concha_
justice_reform.pdf (noting the need for qualitative evaluation beyond numbers); Database
Administrator, Mexico Rule of Law III, Mexico in Mérida, MEXICOJOBS77 (May 1, 2012),
http://www.mexicojobs77.com/Database_Administrator_Mexico_Rule_of_Law_III_Mexico_
in_Merida-8299232.html.
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and political economic concerns. 92 John and Jean Comaroff have
warned of a growing fetishism with the law, which has displaced politics
as a means to address social disorder. 93 They describe a “preoccupation
with legalities, and with the legal subject” as a result of growing
concerns with lawlessness and “post-colonial dis/order and its massmediated representation.” 94 Other scholars have suggested ways the
demands for U.S.-style legal reform have served as a means to assure a
particular type of economic development, one conducive to an
expansion of U.S.-dominated corporate interests and global economic
integration. 95 The impetus behind rule of law projects has often been the
belief that markets require predictable legal structures to protect
property rights, facilitate foreign direct investments, and contract
enforcement—that is, to establish U.S. law as the “lingua franca for
business and politics.” 96 Still others have referred to the unvaried
exportation of the U.S. criminal justice system as an effort to achieve
global governance through crime. 97 Indeed, the very agencies funded to
export the rule of law have been transformed into global intelligence
agencies with purposes that transcend issues related to transnational
crime. 98

92 See generally David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past,
Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
74 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); Kerry Rittich, Who’s Afraid of the Critique of
Adjudication?: Tracing the Discourse of Law in Development, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 929 (2001)
(describing the historical development of the law and development movement as a means to
strengthen market economies); Shannon M. Roesler, The Ethics of Global Justice Lawyering, 13
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 185 (2010).
93 Comaroff & Comaroff, supra note 2, at 31.
94 Id. at 21; Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy 1 (Carnegie
Endowment for Int’l Peace, Democracy & Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 30, 2002),
available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf (describing rule of law projects as a
favorite item on donor laundry list of “good governance reforms”).
95 Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some Critical
Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 441 (2010) (noting both U.S. governmental and
nongovernmental initiatives to promote the rule of law in developing countries); see also MARIA
DAKOLIAS, THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ELEMENTS OF
REFORM 3 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 319, 1996), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/3817166-1185895645304/
4044168-1186409169154/20pub_br214.pdf; Roger C. Riddell, Is Aid Working? Is This the Right
Question
to
be
Asking?,
OPEN
DEMOCRACY
(Nov.
20,
2009),
http://www.opendemocracy.net/roger-c-riddell/is-aid-working-is-this-right-question-to-beasking.
96 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy, in GLOBAL
PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 306, 307 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) [hereinafter GLOBAL
PRESCRIPTIONS]; Gordon, supra note 95, at 443.
97 Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 91–96
(2010) (reviewing the literature on this point).
98 Ginger Thompson & Scott Shane, Cables Portray Expanded Reach of Drug Agency, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2010, at A1.
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In the context of Latin America, the Mérida Initiative rule of law
program may be best understood as a political instrument designed to
accomplish the varied goals described above, particularly when
considered through a historical lens. The United States has long
imposed its will in order to influence the passage of legislation within
the boundaries of sovereign states or has otherwise enacted domestic
laws with extraterritorial reach—all in defense of national interests—
and nowhere more so than in Latin America. 99 As historian Greg
Grandin has written, Latin America “has long served as a workshop of
empire” in ways that are critical to the expansive global power of the
United States. 100 Many U.S. multinational corporations originated in
Latin America, and much of the region’s economic growth was financed
by U.S. banks and investors. 101 In addition, nation building through
legal reforms has almost always accompanied military intervention and
has functioned as a means through which to expand and protect U.S.
security, economic, and domestic political interests. 102 An examination
of the history of such programs illustrates that despite the discursive
shift from an emphasis on militarization to institution-building, the
Mérida Initiative rule of law program may best be understood as “a
political weapon to achieve American goals.” 103
A.

The Mérida Initiative’s Rule of Law Program: Template Redux

The Mérida Initiative reflects long-established practices by which
the United States has engaged in directing the legal affairs of other
countries, including preparing new constitutions, organizing legislative
bodies, codifying laws, and establishing judicial systems. 104 The United
States significantly increased funding for judicial reform projects in
Latin America in the last fifty years. 105 U.S. law reform efforts embedded
99 CRAIG ARCENEAUX & DAVID PION-BERLIN, TRANSFORMING LATIN AMERICA: THE
INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC ORIGINS OF CHANGE 52 (2005).
100 GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE’S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA, THE U.S. AND THE RISE OF NEW
IMPERIALISM 1–2 (Henry Holt and Company 2006).
101 Id. at 17.
102 Id. at 26, 87–120 (describing U.S. initiatives to organize paramilitary insurrections or
facilitate military coups throughout Latin America in order to suppress leftist political
movements and maintain interests and power tied to authoritarian and free market
governments).
103 Gian Carlo Delgado-Ramos & Silvina Maria Romano, Political-Economic Factors in U.S.
Foreign Policy: The Colombia Plan, the Mérida Initiative, and the Obama Administration, 38
LATIN AM. PERSP. 93, 95 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 See Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian
Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259, 279 (2004); see also Bryant G. Garth, Exporting and
Importing Democracy, Law and Human Rights, NACLA REP. AM., Jan./Feb. 2007, at 29, 30.
105 Bonner, supra note 2, at 169. In 1961, the United States established the Alliance for
Progress for the purpose of establishing U.S.-style legal systems. McLeod, supra note 97, at 84;
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in the Alliance for Progress, a Cold War project designed to counteract
revolutionary movements, employed a comprehensive set of strategies
throughout the region to shift the methods and structure of legal
education to a U.S. model, to fashion the legal profession and retrain
attorneys to fit the prototype of a U.S. lawyer, and to reshape
jurisprudential philosophy. 106 As a foreign aid/foreign policy strategy,
the United States sought to “ensure that Latin America developed in
ways that strengthened pro-U.S. politicians and created economic
conditions that would limit the appeal of anti-U.S. or pro Communist
forces.” 107
The United States has promoted judicial reform strategies as a form
of development assistance and, as with the Mérida Initiative, has often
linked military aid with funding for rule of law programs. The exporting
of criminal law American-style was part of the U.S. counter-insurgency
measures in El Salvador during the 1980s in function of U.S. “domestic
politics, and the geopolitical needs and agenda of the Reagan
administration.” 108 The Mérida Initiative shares much in common with
Plan Colombia: a counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics policy
designed to strengthen judicial institutions, enhance criminal
prosecution, and simultaneously shape military strategies. 109
So too with Ecuador. In the late 1990s, the United States increased
foreign aid to Ecuador, including counter-drug funds. In exchange for
the aid, Ecuador was obligated to allow the United States to host an
expanded U.S. military presence within its territory and enact new penal
laws that included mandatory minimum sentences based on U.S.
guidelines that violated Ecuador’s long-held legal norms and
constitutional protections. 110 Ecuador was also required to document a
rise in the rates of persons detained for drug offenses regardless of

see MARTHA L. COTTAM, IMAGES AND INTERVENTION: U.S. POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA 83
(2009).
106 JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN
LATIN AMERICA 4 (1980); see also Garth, supra note 104, at 29–30.
107 JEFFREY F. TAFFET, FOREIGN AID AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN
LATIN AMERICA 2 (2007).
108 Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of Legal
Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 649 (2007); see also MARGARET POPKIN,
PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE: OBSTACLES TO BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW IN EL SALVADOR 71
(2000) (noting the failure of such efforts).
109 HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 43, at 7 (noting the protection of a pipeline as motivation
for Plan Colombia); John Lindsay-Poland, Retreat to Colombia: The Pentagon Adapts its Latin
American Strategy, NACLA REP. AM., Jan./Feb. 2010, at 22, 23 (noting how such efforts then
facilitated the moving of other civilian functions into the hands of the military).
110 SANDRA G. EDWARDS & COLETTA A. YOUNGERS, DRUG LAW REFORM IN ECUADOR:
BUILDING MOMENTUM FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE, BALANCED AND REALISTIC APPROACH 4, 5
(2010), available at http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Drug%20Policy/
2011/Spanish/joint%20pubs/ecuador%20memo.pdf.
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whether the numbers of individuals involved in trafficking illegal drugs
had also risen. 111
Judicial reform in Latin America was also mandated by the
Washington Consensus institutions and funded by loans that required
structural adjustment programs, the downsizing of government, and the
privatization of state functions. 112 Mexico was a particular focus of
World Bank directives to assure the responsiveness of Mexico’s judicial
system to economic liberalization strategies. 113 While efforts have
focused on forging a judicial system disposed to ratify economic
liberalization strategies and enhancing the capacity of the criminal
justice and penal systems, social justice issues have been ignored.
Protections of the rights of labor or improvements to family law, for
example, have not been a priority of the funding entities. 114
B.

Assessment of Mérida’s Rule of Law Program’s Antecedents

The outcomes of the various rule of law programs in Latin America
have been assessed by a number of scholars. James A. Gardner closely
examined U.S. legal assistance programs associated with the Alliance for
Progress. 115 Gardner served as a Ford Foundation official and
participated in the funding of many of these projects. He determined
that such efforts were routinely rejected by Latin Americans as U.S.ethnocentric and were inapplicable to the circumstances where they
were being implemented (“not a cure but a disease”). 116 Gardner found
U.S. lawyers were unprepared and unfamiliar with the language,
Id.
LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY, WORLD BANK, INITIATIVES IN LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM 3,
28–34 (2002), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/
3817166-1185895645304/4044168-1186409169154/18initiativesFinal.pdf (documenting judicial
reform efforts by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank).
113 Weissman, supra note 54, at 849.
114 See DAKOLIAS, supra note 95, at 3; KIRSTI SAMUELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM IN POSTCONFLICT COUNTRIES: OPERATIONAL INITIATIVES AND LESSONS LEARNT 33 (World Bank, Soc.
Dev. Paper No. 37, 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Resources/
WP37_web.pdf; Peter DeShazo & Juan Enrique Vargas, Judicial Reform in Latin America: An
Assessment, 17 POL’Y PAPERS AM. 8, 14 (2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/0609_latin_judicial_reform.pdf; Alexis James Gilman, Making
Amends with the Mexican Constitution: Reassessing the 1995 Judicial Reforms and Considering
Prospects for Further Reform, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 947, 956 (2003); Thomas W. Slover,
Tequila Sunrise: Has Mexico Emerged from the Darkness of Financial Crisis?, 5 NAFTA: L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 91, 99, 117–18 (1999); Jorge A. Vargas, An Introductory Lesson to Mexican Law:
From Constitutions and Codes to Legal Culture and NAFTA, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1337, 1339
(2004); Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side
Effects of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 401, 419–20 (1995).
115 See generally GARDNER, supra note 106.
116 Id. at 11, 233, 241, 245 (noting the expectation that Latin American lawyers would have
to “know and have the very feel of the American concept of law if peace through law is to be
achieved” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
111
112
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economics, politics, culture, and legal structures. 117 U.S.-style rule of law
programs, he noted, failed to produce reforms, contribute to political
democracy, or economic development, but instead fostered the
perception that law functioned as a repressive mechanism. 118
Researchers have also criticized Plan Colombia’s “judicialization”
efforts for encouraging “overzealous mass arrests” of civilians and
harming community relations. 119 U.S. funds were used for smear
campaigns against Colombian Supreme Court justices as well as labor
organizations and civil society groups. 120 One scholar who helped to
direct a human rights project in Colombia has observed that Colombia’s
“Justice and Peace Law” program, funded by the U.S. Department of
Justice, contributed to the remobilization of paramilitary forces. 121
Others have suggested that Colombia’s rule of law program served to
provide a rationale for military funding, and diminished respect for the
rule of law while contributing to a humanitarian disaster. 122
Ecuadorean compliance with U.S.-imposed rule of law conditions
requiring increased numbers of arrests resulted in an unprecedented
rise in the imprisonment of the most vulnerable sectors of society and
violated long-held legal precepts about crime and punishment. 123
Evaluations of efforts in El Salvador and Guatemala have reached
similar conclusions: Where U.S. rule of law programs have been
introduced to protect U.S. national interests, they have been largely
inimical to the interests of the people living in these countries. 124
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 4–6, 105–06, 280, 283; see also Moliterno, supra note 80, at 769, 771 (noting how a
rule of law project to export the ABA Model Code of Judicial Ethics became the means to
subvert the independence of the judiciary in Georgia).
119 ADAM ISACSON & ABIGAIL POE, CTR. FOR INT’L POL’Y, AFTER PLAN COLOMBIA:
EVALUATING “INTEGRATED ACTION,” THE NEXT PHASE OF U.S ASSISTANCE 17 (2009), available
at http://justf.org/files/pubs/091203_col.pdf.
120 Karen DeYoung & Claudia J. Duque, A Case of Aid Gone Bad in Colombia, WASH. POST,
Aug. 21, 2011, at A01.
121 Milburn Line, Retooling U.S. Policy for Peace in Colombia, PEACE & JUST. POL’Y BRIEF,
Feb. 2011, at 1, 2, available at http://www.sandiego.edu/peacestudies/documents/ipj/
Policy_Brief_Colombia_2011.pdf (describing the failure of efforts to prosecute paramilitaries
for atrocities committed against civilians and their eventual release and return to criminal
activities).
122 HAUGAARD ET AL., supra note 43, at 26; María Clemencia Ramírez Lemus et al.,
Colombia: A Vicious Circle of Drugs and War, in DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE IMPACT OF U.S. POLICY 99, 132–33 (Coletta A. Youngers & Eileen Rosen eds., 2005).
Colombia now has the greatest number of displaced persons of any other country in the world
except Sudan. Forrest Hylton, Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success, 17 BROWN J. OF WORLD
AFF. 99, 108 (2010); Line, supra note 121, at 1.
123 EDWARDS & YOUNGERS, supra note 110, at 5. In 2009, as a result of these conditions and
their consequences, Ecuador terminated the foreign aid arrangement. Id. at 4.
124 See ANTHONY K. STAPLETON, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE U.S. QUEST FOR SECURITY IN
EL SALVADOR 9, 77 (2007), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a468788.pdf
(report submitted by student at the Joint Forces Staff College noting the misplaced efforts to
protect U.S national security interests from threats of transnational organized crime).
117
118
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Moreover, the conditions attached to Washington Consensus funds
allocated to Mexico that required cuts in public spending and the
privatization of public functions could not have helped but to
undermine the capacity of the Mexican government to carry out its law
and order responsibilities. 125
C.

Rule of Law Programs: “The New Moral Imperative”

Despite critical assessments of past efforts, the United States
continues to endeavor to remake the legal systems in other parts of the
world. Recently, the specter of transnational crime has become the “new
moral imperative[]” for extraterritorial intervention in the form of rule
of law programs. 126 U.S. politicians have described foreign drug
trafficking and organized crime as “the new communism, the new
monolithic threat” requiring a heightened criminal justice response. 127
USAID’s assistant administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean
declared that crime was now considered “the leading threat in some
countries to economic growth and the leading threat to democracy.” 128
The United States has established the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial
Development, Assistance and Training to “assist prosecutors and
judicial personnel in other countries develop and sustain effective
criminal justice institutions” and boasts that it “provides justice sector
development assistance in practically every region of the world.” 129
International criminal drug-related cases have developed into a
Salvadorans understood that the U.S. rule of law program was a counterinsurgency mechanism
and “political tool” and thus not trusted. Id. at 9, 47; Rachel Sider, Renegotiating “Law and
Order”: Judicial Reform and Citizen Responses in Post War Guatemala, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION
137, 145, 151–53 (2003) (observing that nearly all Guatemalans have no trust in the very
institutions that USAID partnered with and instead have resorted to alternative forms of
justice); see also SAMUELS, supra note 114, at 14 (noting studies that demonstrated no real
evidence of improvement).
125 ANNE ORFORD, READING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE USE
OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 89 (2003) (describing the conditions attached to IMF and
World Bank funding including privatization, cuts to public funding, and deregulation); see
MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY: IMPACTS OF IMF AND WORLD
BANK REFORMS 15 (1997) (describing structural adjustment policies that require the
dismantling of state institutions).
126 Peter Andreas, The Rise of the American Crimefare State, 14 WORLD POL’Y J. 37, 40
(1997) (quoting ETHAN NADELMANN, COPS ACROSS BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 475 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 Id. at 37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 Cave & Schmidt, supra note 73 (quoting Mark Feierstein, Asst. Admin. for Latin Am. &
the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev.) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129 Our Mission, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance & Training, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see
Mission Statement, Strategic Plan, Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance &
Training, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/opdat/about/strategicplan.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
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significant part of the caseload of local U.S. federal prosecutors’ offices
that pursue these matters even in the absence of proof that drugs have
entered the United States and that defendants have posed national
security threats. 130
Perhaps most notably, rule of law programs are concomitant
aspects of a larger military strategy. In its field manual on
counterinsurgency, the Department of Defense has identified rule of law
campaigns as critical measures to establish the legitimacy of U.S.
intervention and efforts to influence political power. 131 Rule of law
programs that focus on strengthening the criminal justice system
(“courts, cops, and corrections”) have been a key intervention strategy
in Iraq and Afghanistan. 132 In Pakistan, U.S. intelligence agencies plan
and assist with local criminal prosecution to control public opinion
about alleged insurgents. 133 Moreover, U.S. military forces, as opposed
to civilian agencies, lead such programs relying on their ability to
“command and control.” 134 Military equipment and technology have
been adapted as extensions of law-related functions. 135

130 Benjamin Weiser, For Prosecutor in New York, A Global Beat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011,
at A1 (describing “the expanded global reach of” the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern
District of New York).
131 David P. Fidler, Counterinsurgency, Rule Of Law Operations, and International Law,
ASIL INSIGHTS, Sept. 2007, available at http://www.asil.org/insights070919.cfm (noting that
rule of law campaigns as have been central to counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and
Afghanistan); see David H. Petraeus & James F. Amos, Foreword: Counterinsurgency, FIELD
MANUAL NO. 3-24/MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION NO. 3-33.5 (2006), available at
http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm3_24.pdf (asserting that counterinsurgency strategies must include the establishment of the rule of law); Bonner, supra note 2,
at 169; Jim Michaels, U.S. Military Works with Mexico’s: Passes on Skills to Help Fight Drug
Traffickers, USA TODAY, Apr. 6, 2010, at 7A (reporting on comments of military commanders
on the similarities between intervention strategies among Iraq, Afghanistan, and Mexico); US
Military Chief Backs Counter-Insurgency for Mexico, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2009, 9:47 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN06397194; see also Bacevich, supra note 2, at 7; John
Lindsay-Poland, Beyond the Drug War: The Pentagon’s Other Operations in Latin America,
NACLA REP. AM., May/June 2011, at 8, 11 (noting that various humanitarian projects,
including medical and veterinary services, are linked to U.S. military missions as public
relations ploys, according to military spokespersons, to “show[] the military in a different light”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
132 Ronald T.P. Alcala, Vanquishing Paper Tigers: Applying Comparative Law Methodology
to Enhance Rule of Law Development, ARMY LAW., Mar. 2011, at 5, 8 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
133 James J. Saulino, Strategic Choices: Four Legal Models for Counterterrorism in Pakistan, 2
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 247, 252 n.16 (2011).
134 Alcala, supra note 132, at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
135 Andreas, supra note 126, at 41–42. These developments suggest that the field of law may
rival the field of anthropology in service of military counterinsurgency efforts. See generally
CATHERINE BESTEMAN ET AL., THE COUNTER-COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL: OR, NOTES ON
DEMILITARIZING AMERICAN SOCIETY (2009) (critiquing the role of anthropology in
counterinsurgency strategies); John D. Kelly et al., Introduction: Culture, Counterinsurgency,
Conscience, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND GLOBAL COUNTERINSURGENCY 1 (John D. Kelly et al. eds.,
2010).
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These efforts have spawned what some have called a “[r]ule of Law
industry” dominated by “rule doctors” that has yielded vast profits to
U.S. contractors. 136 National and local bar organizations, law schools,
private foundations, together with USAID, the DOJ, and other federal
entities have invested in exporting U.S. legal principles in support of
democracy and free market economies throughout the world. 137 The
United States serves as a ready and willing donor to continue to fund
rule of law projects to Americanize other judicial systems. 138 These
programs tend to ignore local initiatives for legal change. 139 That the
decisions about the nature of the aid are determined more by the
political and economic interests of the U.S. donors than the needs of the
recipient nation reflects the use of law as a political instrument,
notwithstanding a record of having failed to produce meaningful justice
systems. 140
III. TRANSPLANTING THE RULE OF LAW: CONTEXT AND DIFFERENCES
Legal systems develop and function within a historical context.
They evolve from, and are embedded in, cultural systems and
socioeconomic structures. They transform and are transformed
continually within real-life in which they are to be implemented. Laws
do not merely function as a body of rules to be enforced by a judicial
system, but rather both produce, and are products of, a legal value
system that is itself a distillation of moral order of society and that go

136 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Introduction to GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 96,
at 1; Jean MacKenzie, Afghan Women and the Rule of Law Conundrum, GLOBAL POST (Mar. 7,
2012, 6:14 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/afghanistan/
120306/afghan-women-and-the-rule-law-conundrum.
137 Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Boundaries,
31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 737, 743–44 (1999); see Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Michael Hamilton, Gender and
The Rule of Law in Transitional Societies, 18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 380, 382–83 (2009) (arguing that
rule of law programs “represent[] merely the ego-image of its most ardent proponents”).
138 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 96, at 306. The North American Consortium for Legal
Education was originally established to focus on NAFTA related subject matters. See N. AM.
CONSORTIUM FOR LEGAL EDUC., OPERATING AGREEMENT 3 (1999), available at
http://www.nacle.org/sites/default/files/525_Operating_agreement.pdf.
139 Craig Segal, Note, The Forestry Crisis as a Crisis of the Rule of Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1539, 1561 (2006); see infra Part III.B.
140 Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 104 (1998) (stating that
it is donors who often determine the rule of law reform priorities); Mariana Prado & Michael
Trebilcock, Path Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform, 59 U.
TORONTO L.J. 341, 347 (2009) (noting the commonplace failure of rule of law programs);
Upham, supra note 94, at 1.
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beyond conflict resolution. 141 They reflect ideological principles and
emanate from the political and economic institutions of place. 142
Efforts to transfer legal standards from developed countries to less
developed countries have been the subject of long-standing critique,
particularly given the ubiquity with which legal transplantation now
occurs under circumstances of globalization. 143 The Global Legal
Standards Research Group determined that the United States has
continued to replicate its systems based on belief of its inherent
superiority, regardless of whether the normative frameworks
inextricably associated with particular legal codes are suitable for
transport. 144 A comparative study of the transplantation of criminal
codes from one country (or international institution) to another country
found that the introduction of new laws by outsiders were always
accompanied by a set of assumptions from the exporting country with
questionable relevance to the recipient country. 145 Michael Walzer has
urged that different goods, including justice have different social
meanings which shape their value: “[j]ustice is rooted in the distinct
understanding of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, that constitute
a shared way of life. To override those understandings is (always) to act
unjustly.” 146
These critiques point to the flaws inherent in the Mérida Initiative.
The Mexico rule of law program seeks to transplant a system that by its
very nature is foundational to nationhood and cannot readily take root
except through the efforts of the local polity according to its history and
traditions. 147 Laws must emanate from local social and political
141 Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo & Lawrence Friedman, Latin Legal Cultures in the Age of
Globalization, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 1, 2 (Lawrence M. Friedman
& Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo eds., 2003).
142 See David Kennedy, Law and the Political Economy of the World, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 7,
9, 12 (2013).
143 John L. Comaroff, Colonialism, Culture, and the Law: A Foreward, 26 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 305, 306 (2001) (referring to the colonial rationale, in the name of “progress” to
impose a “civilized” judicial system (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gordon, supra note
95, at 444; Idlir Peçi & Evert Stamhuis, Judicial Interpretation and Substantive Legality in
Criminal Law: A Comparative Study on Distribution of Power in Albania and The Netherlands,
17 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. & CRIM. JUST. 113, 114 (2009).
144 See The Global Legal Standards Report, At the End of the End of History—Global Legal
Standards: Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem?, 9 GLOBAL JURIST 5 (2009) [hereinafter
Global Legal Standards Report], available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol9/iss3/art2 (noting
the local nature of justice that shapes local identifies); Dezalay & Garth, supra note 96, at 307
(noting that the United States is “the leading exporter of rules”).
145 Peçi & Stamhuis, supra note 143, at 114; see Alex de Waal, Protecting Civilians in Fragile
States, Presentation to Oxfam-Novib, The Hague (Sept. 21, 2009), available at
https://groups.google.com/forum/?hl=en&fromgroups#!topic/sudan-johnashworth/pZFFACXMP_A (noting that countries cannot be made to work “from the inside
with an outside template” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
146 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 7, 314
(1983).
147 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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circumstances, even as Mexicans may choose to adopt and borrow from
external systems as their circumstances may require. 148
A.

The United States and Mexico: Legal Systems and Differences that
Matter

An assessment of the U.S. law reform project in Mexico requires an
appreciation of the historical and political differences in legal systems
and legal cultures. 149 Mexican legal traditions include ongoing attention
to indigenous rights, constitutionally designed cooperative land use,
corporative models of labor relations, and legal pluralism. 150 The
Mexican Constitution of 1917, the conceptual political and judicial
foundation for the nation, is formulated upon a commitment to social
rights more so than most constitutions. 151 The Mexican Constitution
was a product of the revolution of 1910 from which it gained its
“[r]evolutionary legitimacy.” 152 It created social property rights (ejidos)
and included laws designed to guarantee a form of collective title held
by those who worked the land. 153 A textual reading reveals broad
protections of civil rights and prohibitions on discrimination against
“human dignity or individual rights or liberties,” which include gender,
civil status, or ethnic origin. 154 The Mexican Constitution commits to a
right to education and health care. 155 As a foundational document, the
148 Pilar Domingo, Novel Appropriations of the Law in the Pursuit of Political and Social
Change in Latin America, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL
ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA 254, 255 (Javier A. Couso et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter CULTURES
OF LEGALITY] (changes in laws are “historically, culturally and politically situated”); Alexandra
Huneeus et al., Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Contemporary
Latin America, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY 3 (noting the ever shifting and contentious nature of
legal culture); Global Legal Standards Report, supra note 144, at 5 (noting the local nature of
justice that shapes local identifies).
149 SAMUELS, supra note 114, at 15 (noting that a review of rule of law programs conducted
in 2006 revealed few lasting changes and few improvements from the earlier efforts to bring
about legal system changes).
150 See Domingo, supra note 148, at 263.
151 ARIADNA ESTÉVEZ, HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREE TRADE IN MEXICO: A DISCURSIVE
SOCIOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 61 (2008).
152 Sergio López-Alyllón & Héctor Fix-Fierro, “Faraway, So Close!” The Rule of Law and
Legal Change in Mexico, 1970–2000, in LEGAL CULTURE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION supra
note 141, at 285, 293.
153 Id. at 288–89 (noting that the 1917 Mexican Constitution incorporated liberal legal
traditions); Judith Schacherreiter, Un Mundo Donde Quepan Muchos Mundos: A Postcolonial
Legal Perspective Inspired by the Zapatistas, 9 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 13–14 (2009). But see DAVID
BACON, ILLEGAL PEOPLE: HOW GLOBALIZATION CREATES MIGRATION AND CRIMINALIZES
IMMIGRANTS 58 (2008) (noting that as a function of NAFTA-related requirements, Article 27 of
the Mexican Constitution was amended and ejidos may now be sold).
154 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.] (Mex.).
155 Children’s Rights: Mexico, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/law/help/childrights/mexico.php#executive (last updated Feb. 28, 2014).
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constitution functions as a signpost of safeguards and rights that gives
rise to unique expectations derived from the text.
Scholars have explored the fundamental philosophical differences
related to legal culture that distinguish Mexico and the United States. 156
Mexico has implemented a civil law system based on an inquisitorial
model, an approach that creates different expectations about justice. The
inquisitorial system has as its theoretical basis the premise that
outcomes will be determined with “little distortion by partisan legal
representatives.” 157 Judges are considered “career civil servants” rather
than “independent political forces.”158 The historical preference for
written trials has been based on concern that oral trials would allow a
more accomplished or powerful lawyer to overcome a less competent
advocate notwithstanding principles of justice at hand. 159
Mexico has ratified and, at times, has been far more influenced by
human rights norms than the United States. 160 Along with much of
Latin America, it has contributed to the development of regional and
international human rights treaties, many of which the United States has
eschewed. 161 In 1990, it created a national commission on human rights
with the highest annual budget of any ombudsman’s office in the
Americas. 162 Mexican legal values have been further influenced by
liberation theology, concerns wholly absent from U.S. legal culture. 163
Other differences mark variance in legal culture between the
United States and Mexico. The Mexican judicial system has no death
156 See Paul J. Zwier & Alexander Barney, Moving to an Oral-Adversarial System in Mexico:
Jurisprudential, Criminal Procedure, Evidence Law, and Trial Advocacy Implications, 26 EMORY
INT’L L. REV. 189, 194–96, 200–02 (2012) (comparing Mexico’s legal culture of legal positivism
with philosophical principles that underlie oral trials practiced in the United States).
157 John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281 (1974);
Wright, supra note 49, at 369.
158 Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 715, 765 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
159 Zwier & Barney, supra note 156, at 203.
160 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MEXICO–MÉRIDA INITIATIVE REPORT 15, available at
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=33501 (noting that Mexico has taken steps to implement the
Istanbul Protocol, is a party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture, and
has established National Mechanisms to Prevent Torture).
161 Mary Ann Glendon, The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the
Universal Human Rights Idea, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 27, 29–31, 38 (2003). The United States
has refused to ratify the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and denies the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission or Court of Human Rights. See American
Convention on Human Rights, Signatures and Current Ratification, ORG. AM. STATES,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/4.RATIFICATIONS%20AMERICAN%20
CONVENTION.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
162 HUMAN RTS. WATCH, MEXICO’S HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
10–12 (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/mexico0208webw
cover.pdf. Human Rights Watch, while criticizing the Commission for certain weaknesses,
notes its contributions, including raising public awareness about human rights violations in
Mexico. Id. at 16.
163 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 61.
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penalty. 164 Mexico has strict gun control laws, although they have been
eroded by the ease with which the United States sells weapons that find
their way into the hands of drug-cartel members. 165 The country has
historically been associated with pro-labor legislation. 166 Long-standing
values about communitarian obligations to help offset personal losses
have shaped Mexican tort law where tort victims look to be made whole
through social and governmental supports that do not depend on
adversarial litigation. 167 Much of what might otherwise be consigned to
the legal system for resolution in the United States functions differently
within or is often resolved through normative transformations wholly
outside of the law. 168 Where formal legal processes are required, a
significant number of Mexicans have indicated a preference for greater
lay participation in the legal system. 169 Legal education differs in most
respects from U.S. pedagogical approaches; most recent reforms have
encouraged an interdisciplinary and problem-solving approach to
curricular innovations. 170
Legal cultural differences are as relevant to the Mérida Initiative’s
purported plan to improve access to justice and protect rights as they

164 Prisoners are generally allowed greater freedoms within penitentiaries when compared
with prison life in the United States, including same-sex conjugal visits. Mexico Allows Gay
Conjugal Visits, BBC NEWS (July 30, 2007, 11:08 AM), http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/americas/
6922140.stm; see Symposia, The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development of the
Americas, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 16 (1999) (remarks from U.S. Ambassador to Mexico,
Jeffrey Davidow, noting that Mexico has undergone significant legal reforms with regard to
improving human rights for prisoners); Mexican Prisons, FOREIGN PRISONER SUPPORT SERVICE,
http://www.phaseloop.com/foreignprisoners/prison-mexico.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2014)
(noting the rights to conjugal visits for men and women, and an inmate’s right in some
instances to have his entire family reside with him).
165 See Laura Mehalko, Note, This Is Gun Country: The International Implications of U.S.
Gun Control Policy, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 301 (2012).
166 Jeremy Adelman & Miguel Angel Centeno, Between Liberalism and Neoliberalism: Law’s
Dilemma in Latin America, in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 96, at 139, 151; Weissman,
supra note 54, at 851.
167 STEPHEN ZAMORA ET AL., MEXICAN LAW 527–28 (2004).
168 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 70 (suggesting that core human rights work defined within
the realm of structural causes tends to take place outside of the courts due to the difficulty of
litigating economic, social, and cultural rights).
169 Hiroshi Fukurai et al., Is Mexico Ready for a Jury Trial? Comparative Analysis of Lay
Justice Systems in Mexico, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Ireland, 2
MEX. L. REV. 3, 5 (2011).
170 Kossick, supra note 158, at 731–36. Mexico’s law schools require students to contribute a
prescribed number of pro bono hours in order to graduate in contrast with U.S. law schools
where such requirement exists on an ad hoc basis. Larissa Adler Lomnitz & Rodrigo Salazar,
Cultural Elements in the Practice of Law in Mexico: Informal Networks in a Formal System, in
GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS, supra note 96, at 209, 225 (describing six months of required unpaid
work for students to “give back”); James F. Smith et al., Why Mexico? Why Mexico Law? Why
Now?, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 373, 380–81 (2005).
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are to the efforts to redesign Mexico’s criminal justice system. 171 Public
interest law (PIL) in Latin America generally follows a “socialized”
practice tradition that differs from PIL in the United States. 172 Empirical
studies demonstrate that in contrast with U.S. lawyers, Latin American
lawyers prefer “empowering social action that challenges the existing
arrangements of power” and “associate PIL practice with forms of
collective and social mobilization more than with legal mobilization” of
the type associated with U.S. lawyers. 173 Legal activists throughout Latin
America are more likely to successfully pursue the adjudication of
socioeconomic rights than their counterparts in the United States. 174
Mexican human rights groups have contextualized torture and
extrajudicial execution within the context of economic, cultural, and
social rights as opposed to most U.S. human rights groups who
approach such crimes as civil and political violations. 175 They often seek
to address violations of civil and political rights through the
improvement of worker rights and the strengthening of labor unions. 176
Mexican scholars have urged the construction of law-related human
rights norms as a process of “epistemological decolonization” based on
concepts developed through “the region’s social reality, more
specifically, in the lessons of its major revolutions: the populist
movements of Perón and Cárdenas; the Cuban socialist revolution; the
Chilean democratic revolution for human rights; the Sandinista
revolution for democratic socialism; the Zapatista movement for
indigenous rights and democracy . . .” 177
To acknowledge the progressive facets of Mexican legal culture
does not mitigate the current deficiencies and the ways in which the
Mexican legal system fails to fulfill its promise. 178 The Mexican
constitution has functioned more as a matter of principle rather than a

171 Although suffering from serious deficiencies, public defenders are assigned to represent
individuals who cannot afford private counsel in both criminal and civil matters. Kossick, supra
note 158, at 791–92.
172 Fabio de Sa e Silva, Professional Ideology and the Global Journey of Public Interest Law:
Variations in the Meaning of Advocacy Among PIL Practitioners in the US and Latin America 17
(2010) (unpublished working paper) (on file with author).
173 Id. at 9.
174 César Rodríguez-Garavito, Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1669, 1671 (2011).
175 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 66–67, 69. Although there are a growing number of U.S.
lawyers who have sought to frame domestic and poverty related legal issues as human rights
issues, Mexican judicial activists likely have greater experience in this realm than their U.S.
counterparts. See Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 174, at 1674.
176 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 67 (noting that Mexican human rights groups identified
human rights issues in Mexico in the context of a workers’ movement).
177 Id. at 15.
178 See supra Part I.B.
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matter of practice. 179 It has failed to sustain the expectations of the
revolution that inspired its original articles. Recent legislative proposals
would diminish the rights of unions, which have never fully benefited
from historical progressive labor laws. 180 The Mexican criminal justice
system suffers from many deficiencies: public defenders with less
political power compared with prosecuting attorneys and case
overloads, inadequate interpretation services, abusive detention
practices, and corruption, just to name a few. 181
But the differences matter. Just as the U.S. rule of law model is a
unique “historical product embedded in U.S. politics and the U.S. social
structure,” so too does Mexico’s legal culture reflect a unique history
and tradition. 182 Given these differences, and the political, economic,
and military motivations associated with the rule of law project, the
Mérida Initiative’s rule of law program may contribute to undermining
the legitimacy of the law itself. 183 Moreover, as next described, U.S.
efforts to direct the reform of the Mexican legal system run counter to
current efforts by the Mexican polity to address issues pertaining to
crime, justice, and law. 184

179 Domingo, supra note 148, at 259 (noting that it represents “the first truly social
constitution of the twentieth century” and well ahead of European nations).
180 Dan La Botz & Robin Alexander, Unions Oppose Labor Law Reform: For Quite Different
Reasons, 17 MEX. LAB. NEWS & ANALYSIS, (2012), available at http://www.ueinternational.org/
MLNA/mlna_articles.php? id=205#1498.
181 INGRAM ET AL., supra note 54, at 8, 10; Alicia Ely Yarmin & Pilar Noriega Garcia, Absence
of the Rule of Law Diagnosis and Implications for a Mexican Transition to Democracy, 21 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 467, 483 (1999). Of course, many of these deficiencies are the same
as those in the United States. See Monica Davey, In Missouri, State Budget Problems Take Toll
on Lawyers for the Indigent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2010, at A15 (describing declining resources
for public defenders causing their offices to refuse cases, and suffers from such overwhelming
caseloads that provide “nothing more than the illusion of a lawyer”); Ian Urbina & Sean D.
Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at
A22 (describing two judges who sentenced juveniles without counsel or due process to privately
owned detention centers in exchange for payment of money); see also CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH,
INJUSTICE: LIFE AND DEATH IN THE COURTROOMS OF AMERICA (2012) (detailing corruption and
bribery involving a capital case).
182 Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Corporate Law Firms, NGOs, and Issues of Legitimacy
for a Global Legal Order, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2309, 2316 (2012). Moreover, notwithstanding
the deficiencies in the legal system, studies demonstrate that among some sectors of Mexican
society, support for the traditional Mexican legal system remains firm. INGRAM ET AL., supra
note 54, at 3, 13.
183 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 182, at 2345.
184 Boaventura De Sousa Santos, The World Social Forum and the Global Left, 36 POL. &
SOC’Y 247, 252 (2008) (noting that even the “conventional left” would be wanting both
theoretically and analytically to interpret the needs of the social movements in Latin American
and the Global South generally).
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The Mérida Initiative Versus Mexican Reforms: Trending
Differences

To be sure, the Mexican judicial system needs fixing. The question
is how and who is best fitted to enact legal reforms to address the
dynamic context within which the rise in crime and drug cartels has
occurred. 185 Mexican legal experts, human rights activists, and citizens
have not ignored the structural deficiencies of the criminal justice
system. On the contrary, scholars and human rights activists have
consistently raised the need for legal reform and called for a
strengthened judiciary as fundamental to the elimination of drug-cartel
violence and the improvement of the social fabric of society. 186 In fact, as
this Part demonstrates, actual or proposed legal reforms are underway
that are not only independent of, but are at variance with, the Mérida
Initiative rule of law program.
1.

United States Funded Reforms: Power to the Prosecutor

The Mérida Initiative’s funding of institution-building focuses
primarily on strengthening Mexico’s justice system. 187 Reports that
analyze the Mérida Initiative reveal that “rule of law” funds have been
allocated principally to enhance criminal prosecutorial functions
through training and technical support. 188 In fact, USAID and its rule of
law collaborators have concentrated almost entirely on the training of
prosecutors. 189 Congressional reports that track Department of Justice
funding disclose that $19 million has been allocated to prosecutorial
functions; additional funding for USAID since the inception of Phase II
has been reserved for the training of prosecutors. 190 State Department
“fact sheets” that feature Mérida Initiative achievements itemize such
See supra Part I.A–B.
Stephanie Erin Brewer, Structural Human Rights Violations: The True Face of Mexico’s
War on Crime, 16 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 7, 10 (2009).
187 OLSON, supra note 85, at 2 (identifying funding allocation for information technology,
the improvement of court management and prosecutorial capacity, victim and witness
protection and restitution programs, and forensics); see also WILSON CTR., supra note 76.
188 OLSON, supra note 85; SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 24 (describing U.S. State
Department and USAID funding focused on increasing prosecutorial capacity building and
other law enforcement mechanisms); see also WILSON CTR., supra note 76.
189 See, e.g., U.S.-MEX. STATE ALLIANCE P’SHIP, QUARTERLY REPORT OF ACTIVITIES, APRIL 1,
2011–JUNE 30, 2011, 3D QUARTER REPORT 6–18, 21 (2011), available at
http://www.statealliancepartnership.org/activities_files/3_quarter_report_FY201011.pdf
(detailing almost exclusively trainings for prosecutors); see also William Hine-Ramsberger,
Note, Drug Violence and Constitutional Revisions: Mexico’s 2008 Criminal Justice Reform and
the Formation of Rule of Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 291, 315 (2011) (noting that the reforms
“perpetuate the expansive power of the public prosecutor”).
190 SEELKE & FINKLEA, supra note 71, at 25 n.131.
185
186
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accomplishments all in the realm of prosecution and punishment. 191
The Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs described rule of law efforts in Mexico as
synonymous with enhancing the ability to prosecute, convict, and
incarcerate. 192
The U.S. focus on strengthening prosecutorial efforts reveals both
an ignorance and arrogance about the desires of the Mexican polity. 193
Mexicans have long expressed concerns regarding the excessive power
of police and prosecutors. 194 Comparative legal studies have
demonstrated that Mexicans have a high rate of distrust for the office of
the prosecutor when compared with other nations. 195 Notwithstanding
these findings, the United States has funded the Mexican Attorney
General’s office and has done so in the face of ongoing scandals related
to corruption, bribery, and other crimes that have plagued the
bureaucracy. In July 2011, some four years after the inception of the
Mérida Initiative, 111 prosecutors were charged with bribery and
corruption, abuse of power and “botched investigations,” causing the
Attorney General’s resignation even while U.S. rule of law funds have
bolstered the office. 196 More recently, in September 2012, the Attorney
General’s office has come under investigation for collaboration in the
transport of drugs leading to the resignation of the top organized crime
prosecutor. 197 USAID rule of law funds have been allocated to police
departments implicated in complicity with drug cartels and some of the
worst human rights violations. 198 All said, USAID and its contractors are
implicated in the very system in which Mexicans have the least trust.
U.S. EMBASSY IN MEXICO, supra note 81.
Johnson, supra note 78.
193 See supra Part III.A.
194 See Justice Reform Season Opens, CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07MEXICO4881 (Sept. 10, 2007,
11:03 PM), http://cablegatesearch.net/cable.php? id=07MEXICO4881&q=07mexico4881.
195 Fukurai & Krooth, supra note 82, at 65.
196 Assoc. Press, Mexican Prosecutors Face Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2011, at A6 (noting
that over 100 prosecutors in the Attorney General’s office faced charges for crimes including
abuse of power); Tony Nelson, News and Analysis March 21–April 3, 2011, MEXICO SOLIDARITY
NETWORK (Apr. 4, 2011, 1:39 PM), http://mexicosolidarity.org/post/2011/april/
newsandanalysismarch21april32011; see also Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico: Woman Picked to Fight
Cartels, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at A6 (noting the ineffectiveness of the Office of the
Prosecutor).
197 Randal C. Archibold, Top Mob Prosecutor Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2012, at A8;
Mexico’s Federal Attorney General Investigates Its Own Air Fleet for Drug Trafficking, THE
FULANO FILES (Sept. 8, 2012), http://fulano.info/wordpress/?p=1379.
198 Human Rights in Mexico: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Foreign Affairs, Tom Lantos
Human Rights Commission, 112th Cong. 9 (2012) (statement of Nik Steinberg, Mexico
Researcher for Human Rights Watch), available at http://tlhrc.house.gov/docs/transcripts/
2012_5_10_Human_Rights_In_Mexico/Santiago_Aguirre_Testimony.pdf (noting that the U.S.
is aiding in some of the worst human rights abuses); see Randal C. Archibold, Mexican Agencies
Clash Publicly Over Shooting of C.I.A. Employees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2012, at A24 (reporting
on charges that the federal police tried to kill U.S. CIA employees); Randal C. Archibold & Eric
Schmitt, Americans Shot in Mexico Were C.I.A. Operatives in Fight Against Drugs, N.Y. TIMES,
191
192
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Mérida’s emphasis on strengthening formal prosecutorial powers
appears to be oblivious to the fact that the balance of power in the
Mexican judiciary favors prosecutors. 199 To further exacerbate the
preponderance of prosecutorial power, the rule of law program has
introduced the use of the plea bargain (juicio abreviado). 200 As the office
of the prosecutor has greater resources than the defendant, plea
bargaining processes make it more likely that it will be easier to induce
defendants to give up their rights and plead guilty. 201 Indeed, the
introduction of plea-bargaining has created additional fear among
Mexicans that unethical prosecutors may coerce innocent persons into
inculpating themselves. 202
The expansion of the powers of prosecutor’s office similarly
undermines the desires of Mexicans to have greater lay presence and
control of the criminal justice system. 203 Comparative legal studies
demonstrate that an overwhelming number of Mexicans—more so than
other countries that were included in the studies—have faith in the
abilities of their fellow citizens to sit as jurors and to make fair and just
decisions in the criminal justice process through a jury system. 204
Mexican citizens are also ranked high in terms of willingness to serve as
jurors, even after they were asked to evaluate the dangers associated
with adjudicating a defendant with gang affiliations whose members
might be present and observing courtroom processes. 205 Moreover, the
majority of Mexicans expressed the view that lay presence through the
jury system would lessen crime in their communities. 206 Nonetheless,
notably absent from the Mérida Initiative is any proposal to reintroduce
Aug. 29, 2012, at A4; Ginger Thompson et al., Hand of U.S. Is Seen in Halting General’s Rise,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at A1 (noting concerns that high ranking officials in the Mexican
military were misusing U.S. funds and were involved with drug trafficking).
199 David A. Shirk & Alejandra Rios Cázares, Introduction: Reforming the Administration of
Justice in Mexico, in REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MEXICO 1, 19–20 (Wayne
A. Cornelius & David A. Shirk eds., 2007) (noting that this is the case more so than elsewhere
in the hemisphere); Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona, Criminal Investigation and the Subversion of
the Principles of the Justice System in Mexico, in REFORMING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
IN MEXICO 133, 134, 139–40; Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 62, at 313; Wright, supra note 49, at
369–70 (characterizing Mexico as having a unique form of a civil law model due to the
expansive role of the prosecutor).
200 MATT INGRAM & DAVID A. SHIRK, TRANS-BORDER INST., JUDICIAL REFORM IN MEXICO:
TOWARD A NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 20 (2010), available at http://catcher.sandiego.edu/
items/peacestudies/2010-IngraShirk-JRM%20%282%29.pdf.
201 Craig M. Bradley, Overview, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE A WORLDWIDE STUDY xv, xvii
(Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 1999) (observing that prosecutors with weak cases against
defendants are more likely to offer plea arrangements).
202 INGRAM & SHIRK, supra note 200, at 20.
203 See Fukurai et al., supra note 169, at 22 (noting willingness of Mexicans to participate in a
jury system).
204 Id. at 3, 5 (noting that of the six nations that were part of a comparative study, including
the United States, Mexico had the highest expression of confidence in the jury system).
205 Id. at 27.
206 Id.
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jury trials, “a most effective means of inducting people into a culture of
rights and responsibilities.” 207 Nor is there any reference to training with
regard to the jury system, despite calls for oral trials in Mexico. 208 This
omission, too, suggests indifference for context and conditions in
Mexico and undermines those factors that serve as the foundation for
improved outcomes in the criminal justice system.
It is often difficult for Mexican authorities to resist U.S. pressures
for legal reform, for the law project is part of an extensive network of
conditionalities and quid pro quos, of trade-offs and reciprocities:
Acquiescence on one issue obtains concessions on another. 209 As one
scholar has observed: “The fundamental asymmetry of the relationship
between external and local actors, evident from the start both in who
takes the initiative in judicial reform and who has the money (whether
requested or not) affects all aspects of the reform process as it has
unfolded in Latin America.” 210 Such “passive acceptance,” however,
“does not indicate a genuine commitment to reform or to a particular
reform strategy.” 211 Indeed, Mexican jurists and human rights groups
have denounced these and other reforms that strengthen the hand of
prosecutors, especially laws that authorize the holding of organized
crime suspects for up to eighty days without charges. 212 The president of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and former Mexican
Federal Attorney General Sergio García Ramírez has decried search and
seizure reforms advocated by the United States as attacks on protected
rights. 213 Other critics have charged that the reforms are
unconstitutional, undermine traditional habeas corpus rights, and result
in a two-tiered system of justice—one for “ordinary crime” and the
other for individuals accused of organized crime. 214
207 Bill Keller, A Jury of Whose Peers?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2013, at A23 (describing the
importance of the jury system according to Tocqueville); Adam Liptak, Cases Keep Flowing In,
But the Jury Pool is Idle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A14.
208 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
209 LUIS PÁSARA, LATIN AM. PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS,
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: WORTHWHILE OR
WORTHLESS? 6–8 (2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Jutice%20
Reform%20in%20LATAM.pdf.
210 Id. at 8.
211 Id. at 7.
212 GRAYSON, supra note 44, at 147; Carlsen, supra note 89 (noting that Mexican judges from
the Supreme Court to the lower courts have objected to U.S. reform initiatives); see supra note
194 and accompanying text.
213 Jorge Carrasco Araizaga & Gloria Leticia Diaz, Judicial Reform Marked “Made in
America,” PROCESO 1633, Feb. 17, 2008, at 2 (on file with author). U.S. initiated reforms
included authorizing prosecutors to hold organized crime suspects for up to eighty days
without charges. GRAYSON, supra note 44, at 147; Jorge Alonso, A Thousand and One
Demonstrations: For Life, Petroleum and Rights, REVISTA ENVIO (Apr. 2008),
http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/3750.
214 INGRAM & SHIRK, supra note 200, at 20; Carlsen, supra note 89; Laura Carlsen, On Eve of
Summit, Mexico’s Human Rights Record Comes Under Fire in U.S. Congress, AMERICAS
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The same criticisms were lodged by both the members of the
Mexican congress and a human rights group, Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez
Center. 215 Activists have condemned the replication of U.S. counterterrorism style reforms and have warned that the Mérida Initiative will
result in violations of the rights of Mexican union leaders and
migrants. 216 Their warnings have not remained in the realm of the
speculative: Soldiers unlawfully broke into the homes of at least a dozen
homes in one community in the state of Jalisco on authority claimed as
part of the fight against drug trafficking. 217
The Mérida Initiative’s pronouncements about protecting the
rights of Mexicans have been criticized as “a grotesque and absurd
pretension.” 218 The Archdioceses of Mexico City denounced the plan,
urged its rejection, and called it “offensive charity.” 219 Still others suggest
that the reforms amount to nothing more than window dressing and
observe that confessions obtained through torture remain admissible in
courts of law. 220 Scholars who have surveyed the result of legal reforms
have found little change and few incentives for prosecutors to abandon
abusive practices. 221 They also note that changes are not likely to
materialize without local political, economic, and social commitment. 222
Despite these critiques, U.S. officials and their contractors have
continued with their efforts. They have attempted to deflect the
criticisms, insisting that proposed reforms create efficiency and have
PROGRAM (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1801; see Navarro, supra note
50.
215 Victor Ballinas, CNDH: La Reforma Judicial de Felipe Calderón, Revés a Derechos
Humanos, LA JORNADA (Mexico City, Mex.), Sept. 28, 2007, available at
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/09/28/index.php?section=politica&article=012n1pol
(noting criticisms by the president of the CNDH that the reforms were a grave setback to
fundamental human rights); Centro Nacional de Comunicación Social AC, Reforma Judicial,
Lesiva de los Derechos Humanos, CENCOS (Feb. 25, 2008); see Araizaga & Diaz, supra note 213,
at 3 (noting a number of groups expressing concerns for the new warrantless search laws);
Carlsen, supra note 214 (reviewing concerns of Senator Ramón Galindo and other supporters
of President Calderón); see also Elisabeth Malkin & Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Withholds
Millions in Mexico Antidrug Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, at A7 (noting that the Mexican
government called the U.S. State Department’s call for Mexican legislation to strengthen its
human rights commission an affront to its sovereignty).
216 Carlsen, supra note 89; Carlsen, supra note 214; Navarro, supra note 50.
217 Vania Citlalli de Dios & Rebeca Herrejón, Denuncian Abusos de Ejército, MURAL
(Guadalajara, Mex.), Dec. 10. 2009, at 2.
218 Marc Lacey, Congress Trims Bush’s Mexico Drug Plan, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A6
(quoting from an editorial in the Mexican newspaper, La Jornada) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
219 GRAYSON, supra note 44, at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted).
220 Id. at 146–47 (noting that some reforms would not take full effect until 2016 during
which time torture-coerced confessions will be allowed into evidence); Paco Rodriguez, Justicia
Colonizada, NOTICIAS (Oaxaca, Mex.) (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.noticiasnet.mx/portal/
principal/justicia-colonizada (noting that in some states, the judicial system is in a state of
collapse because of efforts to implement the USAID reforms).
221 Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 62, at 313.
222 Id. at 315.
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readily pressed the Mexican legislature for their passage. 223 The efforts
to give more power and authority to an office in which the vast majority
of Mexican citizens lack confidence will deny the Mérida Initiative the
support and acceptance given to those developed from within
communities affected by crime and impunity. 224
2.

Mexican Reforms: Law, Order, and New Governance Strategies

The Mérida Initiative has ignored capacity of Mexican lawyers and
citizens to develop their own “[l]egal nationalism.” 225 Mexico is situated
in a region where legal systems are undergoing rapid transformations.
Countries throughout the hemisphere chose to appropriate from one
another, often in an attempt to harmonize each other’s laws. 226 More
particularly, and motivated by the challenges of addressing the complex
determinants of crime and the threat to social coherence as a
consequence of a drug-related violence and related economic
dislocation, communities throughout Mexico have developed methods
of new governance to address law and order concerns. 227 In these places,
populist reforms have supplanted traditional legal responses that have
failed to address the rising violence. Social groups engaging in bottomup lawmaking have “become practical lawmakers, accountable to each
other for their choices.”228
223 See TAFOYA, supra note 75, at 9–10 (noting USAID/Proderecho’s lobbying assistance
with Mexican legislators); Justice Reform Season Opens, supra note 194; Strengthening Justice
Systems in Mexico, supra note 75 (noting lobbying efforts throughout).
224 A close analysis of the motivation of the Mexican Attorney General’s office in receiving
USAID funding and support is beyond the scope of this Article, except to point to the
reasoning of Bryant Garth who noted that political elites who enter into these types of importexport arrangements often do so to enhance their own power. Garth, supra note 104, at 30.
225 López-Alyllón & Fix-Fierro, supra note 152, at 294; see Lau, supra note 7 (arguing
relatedly that a focus on westernization as the impetus for legal change denies the domestic
forces that bring about change).
226 Huneeus et al., supra note 148, at 7 (“Latin America is a region of multiple legal orders
that overlap and coexist.”); Esquirol, supra note 7, at 1035; Langer, supra note 108, at 618–19
(describing the mushrooming of criminal codes as part of a regional phenomenon).
227 Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction to LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE
EU AND THE US 1, 2 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (defining new governance as
“a shift away from the monopoly of traditional politico-legal institutions, and implies either the
involvement of actors other than classically governmental actors, or indeed the absence of any
traditional framework of government”).
228 Charles F. Sabel, Design, Deliberation, and Democracy: On the New Pragmatism of Firms
and Public Institutions (paper presented to the Conference on Liberal Institutions, Economic
Constitutional Rights, and the Role of Organizations, European Univ. Inst., Dec. 15–16, 1995),
in LIBERAL INSTITUTIONS, ECONOMIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, AND THE ROLE OF
ORGANIZATIONS
101
(Karl-Heinz
Ladeur
ed.,
1997),
available
at
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/Design.html; see also Amy J. Cohen, Governance
Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357,
379 (describing a new governance view of bottom-up lawmaking as “self-reflexive, transparent,
and dialogically reasoned”).
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In the state of Chiapas, autonomous indigenous communities
together with the Zapatistas have developed legal structures to address
public health issues, mediate conflict, confront crime, and engage
human rights concerns. 229 Operating under a system of Good
Governance Councils (Juntas de Buen Gobierno), they have taken a
novel approach to crime based on community governance and
consensus that includes “forgiveness and goodness,” which, for example,
require a murderer to support a victim’s widow in an effort to avoid
creating “two widows.” 230 Relying on strategies that seek to address the
determinants of crime and conflict, the Zapatista Good Government
Councils have achieved a reduction in crime and impunity, precisely the
stated goal of the Mérida Initiative. 231
Similarly, three municipalities in the state of Guerrero have
developed a justice system, in response to an increase in violence, which
later expanded into a regional justice system. 232 The Guerrero regional
justice system combines indigenous laws with Mexico’s statutory laws as
well as newly developed legal norms, some of which are based on
international human rights principles. 233 Much of it rests on principles
of restorative justice. 234 Criminality in Guerrero is reported to have been
reduced by ninety-two percent. 235

229 Schacherreiter, supra note 153, at 27, 34 (describing various autonomous law-related
structures as part of the Zapatista Juntas of Good Government); see Karina Ansolabehere, More
Power, More Rights? The Supreme Court and Society in Mexico, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY,
supra note 148, at 78, 99 (noting the constitutionalization of indigenous rights was a function of
the Zapatista movement).
230 Andrew Woolford & R.S. Ratner, Disrupting the Informal–Formal Justice Complex: On
the Transformative Potential of Civil Mediation, Restorative Justice and Reparations Politics, 13
CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 5, 14 (2010) (describing the commutation of a life sentence of an army
General who had kidnaped, raped, and tortured indigenous residents of Chiapas); see Paul
Clark, Restorative Justice and ADR: Opportunities and Challenges, 44 ADVOCATE (IDAHO) 13
(2001).
231 Jorge Alonso, The President and the EZLN Issue Their Reports, REVISTA ENVÍO
(Managua, Nicar.) (Oct. 2004), http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/2682; Fred Rosen, Interview
with Javier Sicilia Part II: Reweaving Mexico’s Social Fabric, NACLA (N.Y.C., N.Y.) (Feb. 14,
2012), https://nacla.org/blog/2012/2/14/interview-javier-sicilia-part-ii-reweaving-mexico%E2
%80%99s-social-fabric (observing that in the Zapatista areas, there is almost no crime because
of the focus on strengthening the social fabric).
232 María Teresa Sierra, Indigenous Justice Faces the State: The Community Police Force in
Guerrero Mexico, NACLA REP. AM., Sept./Oct. 2010, at 34. The civilian monitoring system in
Guerrero was created because the official actors in the criminal justice system were found to be
corrupt and responsible for many human rights violations suffered by the people in the region.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 57.
233 Sierra, supra note 232, at 35; see also Ann Gurucharri & Anthony Saudek, Mexican
Justice, 8 HARV. KENNEDY SCH. REV. 83, 89 (2008).
234 Sierra, supra note 232, at 35 (noting, for example, that the Guerrero regional criminal
justice system seeks to re-educate and rehabilitate defendants and to return them to their
communities); see also Gurucharri & Saudek, supra note 233.
235 Maria Teresa Sierra, The Revival of Indigenous Justice in Mexico: Challenges for Human
Rights and the State, 28 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 52, 58 (2005).
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In the state of Puebla, mechanisms for dispensing “indigenous
justice” have emerged as a result of the activism of local residents and
human rights groups who select their own judges and oversee local
courts. 236 These newly developed courts have significantly altered the
ways in which crime and violence are addressed. As one scholar has
observed, local courts are designed to “respect[] the human rights of
people who are arrested. They do not want to reproduce people’s usual
experiences with state justice based on corruption and impunity.” 237
These courts have also fostered the growth of women’s leadership and
greater attention to gender concerns in matters of justice. 238 Similarly,
the Cherán Indian community in Michoacán, determined to develop its
own legal structures, expelled the police force, and patrols its
neighborhoods while eschewing any effort to militarize the region. 239
These new governance judicial mechanisms are being promoted in
other localities throughout Mexico. 240
Other initiatives provide examples of efforts by Mexican activists to
expand and defend their rights, reduce violence, and demand an end to
impunity. 241 Civic organizations and nonprofit groups have created
networks and coalitions through which they gain rights in a broad
spectrum of concerns, including citizen security, police corruption,
labor, trade-related issues, voting rights, housing, and environmental
matters. 242 “Superbarrio” Gómez, a folk hero hailed by scholars of
Mexico, serves as the spokesperson for the Asamblea de Barrios
(Assembly of Neighborhoods), and advocates for the poor in various
legal disputes. 243
While recognizing that there is danger in overstating the
achievements of non-state efforts in Mexico, new governance initiatives
and popular reforms have garnered the support of the residents in the
communities in which they are taking place. They function in
contentious relationship to existing formal laws and create the
possibility of transforming Mexico’s response to crime, drug cartels, and
violence. 244 These new governance strategies tack in the opposite
Id. at 55–58.
Id. at 60–61.
238 Id. at 61–62.
239 Indigenous Communities Rise Up Against Crime, AMERICA, Aug. 15, 2011, at 6–7,
available at http://americamagazine.org/issue/784/signs/indigenous-community-rises-againstcrime; Krauze, supra note 35, at 69.
240 Sierra, supra note 232, at 13.
241 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 49, 66.
242 Id. at 49–50; Diane E. Davis, From Democracy to Rule of Law? Police Impunity in
Contemporary Latin America, REVISTA: HARV. REV. LATIN AM., Fall 2002, at 21, 23.
243 THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 252 (2001).
244 David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 547–48 (2007)
(describing the ways new governance may act as rival to and/or transform existing legal
regulation).
236
237
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direction of the Mérida Initiative rule of law program, which focuses on
enhancing traditional criminal justice processes of prosecution and
punishment.
3.

Mexican Reforms: Law, Order, and International Human Rights
Perspectives

Many of the reform efforts proposed by Mexican legal and human
rights activists seek to incorporate international human rights concepts
to protect citizens against crime and impunity in lieu of the Mérida-style
emphasis on criminal enforcement. 245 A coalition of nongovernmental
organizations and academics have proposed constitutional reforms to
enhance human rights protections including those found in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, as
well as immigrant and refugee protections. 246 They have advocated the
explicit protection of rights that may not be suspended under any
circumstances. 247 These proposals, moreover, seek to direct attention to
the impact of global economics on socio-economic rights in addition to
civil and political rights as a means of addressing the determinants of
crime and insecurity. 248 They reflect the belief, as expressed by Javier
Sicilia, the leader of Mexico’s Movement for Peace with Justice and
Dignity, that the critical legal reforms required to address drug-related
violence would, of necessity, address the paradigmatic neoliberal
economic developments that he describes as constituting “the legal form
of criminality.” 249
Other community groups have organized to implement human
rights treaties to assist victims of torture, wrongful arrests, and those
crimes where no relief could be found in the Mexican criminal justice
system. 250 For example, in Ciudad Juárez, where the numbers of women
murdered has soared, families of victims in collaboration with local
grassroots organizations invoked the Istanbul Protocol, which governs
the processes for the documentation of torture, and thereby forced the
Mexican government to allow outside forensic experts to investigate the

245 Laura Carlsen, Mexico’s False Dilemma: Human Rights or Security, 10 NW. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 146, 151–52 (2012).
246 Press Release, Instituto Mexicano de Derechos Humanos y Democracia, Organizaciones
de la Sociedad Civil y Miembros de la Academia Exhortan a la Cámara de Diputados a Aprobar
la Reforma Constitucional en Materia de Derechos Humanos (Apr. 21, 2010), available at
http://imdhd.org/boletines_detalle.php?id=9976.
247 Id.
248 Carlsen, supra note 245.
249 Rosen, supra note 231.
250 Marc Lacey, Human Rights Defenders Seek Protection in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2010, at A14.
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murders of their loved ones. 251 They succeeded in implementing
international standards in order to obtain an independent investigation
by an entity of their own choosing—the Argentine Forensic
Anthropology Team—notwithstanding the Mexican government’s
initial refusal to allow them into the country. 252 Murdered victims’
families similarly invoked the very same protocol to investigate the
torture of those accused of having committed the crimes. 253
These campaigns reflect Mexican efforts to respond to the
challenges of crime and impunity while insisting upon fairness and
justice for the accused. Social movement activists have employed the
framework of international human rights norms in support of their calls
to modify laws that have been promoted by the U.S. rule of law
program. 254 Indeed, legal activism in the name of human rights has
gained popular support, particularly those that seek to develop collective
social benefits as opposed to notions of individualism based on liberal
thought. 255 As a means of defending alternative forms of seeking justice,
civil society groups have emerged calling for the protection of human
rights defenders. 256 In fact, the recent focus on a human rights
framework has been described as one of the most important reforms,
having “the potential to considerably expand access to justice for
ordinary people.” 257 These developments suggest that the capacity for
developing a “culture of legality” is well developed within Mexico. 258
4.

Mexican/Regional Reforms: Rethinking the War on Drugs

Perhaps the most significant reforms at odds with the Mérida rule
of law program relate to the very heart of the U.S. approach to drug
trafficking and drug violence, that is, the “war on drugs.” As noted
above, the Mérida Initiative’s rule of law program calls for an expanded

See Weissman, supra note 4, at 415–17.
Id.
253 Id. at 417–19.
254 Enrique Krauze, Can This Poet Save Mexico?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2011, at SR6.
255 See Analiese M. Richard, Mediating Dilemmas: Local NGOs and Rural Development in
Neoliberal Mexico, 32 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 166 (2009); Alberto Morales,
Excelente y Buena, Atención en CNDH: Encuesta, EL UNIVERSAL (Mexico City, Mex.) (Dec. 26,
2009), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/648081.html (noting a 2009 survey demonstrating
that Mexicans readily make use of the National Commission on Human Rights for reporting
human rights abuses).
256 See ASOCIACIÓN POLÍTICA NACIONAL PROPUESTA CIVICA, AYUDÁNOS A SALVAR LAS
VIDAS DE LOS LUCHADORES POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS, available at
http://www.propuestacivica.org.mx/derechos-humanos.html.
257 Ríos-Figueroa, supra note 62, at 317–18.
258 Sierra, supra note 232, at 35 (noting that due to the strength of community support, the
alternative system has gained de facto recognition from the state).
251
252
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criminalized response to drug-related crime. 259 Many Mexicans,
however, have rejected this approach as having failed to end the drugrelated violence. 260 Mexican human rights activists have expressed
strong support for the consideration of decriminalization strategies as a
means to address the crisis in Mexico. They have made the link between
drug prohibition and human rights violations and urged the “rethinking
the criminalization of drug use would be a very important long-term
strategy to improving the serious human-rights situation that Mexico is
facing today.” 261 Mexican grassroots movements against the
militarization of the drug war have also called for a legalization
approach. 262 Public opinion surveys have indicated that Mexicans reject
U.S. crime and imprisonment requirements as useless dogma, and
further, Mexicans believe that U.S. strategies have exacerbated their
problems. 263 Public discourses call for solutions more consistent with
Mexican history and culture. 264
These popular sentiments are reflected within findings issued in a
report by the 2009 Latin American Commission on Drugs and
Democracy (the Commission), headed by Ernesto Zedillo, the former
president of Mexico, and the former presidents of Brazil and
Colombia—all countries with a history of problems with drug cartels. 265
The report calls for a new paradigm to address drug-related problems. 266
More specifically, it calls for an end to the U.S. model of war on drugs
policies and punitive drug laws after concluding that such strategies
have done little to diminish drug-related crime or improve public health
outcomes. 267 The report emphasizes public health and social policy
strategies instead of reliance on harsh criminal penalties, and garnered
significant popular support. 268

See supra Part I.C.
Maria de las Heras, 63%: “La Vía Policial y Militar Contra el Narco, un Fracaso en
América Latina,” MILENIO (Mexico City, Mex.) (Feb. 16, 2009), http://www.milenio.com/cdb/
doc/impreso/8533187.
261 Christoper Moraff, Latin America’s Legalization Push, AM. PROSPECT, June 2009,
available at http://prospect.org/article/latin-americas-legalization-push (quoting a Mexico
City-based human-rights activist and political consultant) (internal quotation marks omitted).
262 Randal C. Archibold, Violence Suffocated a Father’s Poetry, But Not His Voice, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2011, at A6; Elisabeth Malkin, Thousands in Mexico City March Against Drug
War, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011, at A8.
263 de las Heras, supra note 260.
264 Id.
265 LATIN AM. COMM’N ON DRUGS & DEMOCRACY, DRUGS AND DEMOCRACY: TOWARD A
PARADIGM SHIFT (2009), available at http://www.drogasedemocracia.org/Arquivos/declaracao_
ingles_site.pdf [hereinafter LATIN AM. COMM’N]; see EDWARDS & YOUNGERS, supra note 110, at
1 (also observing changes to Argentina’s criminal laws relating to drug possession).
266 LATIN AM. COMM’N, supra note 265.
267 Id.
268 Id.
259
260
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The Latin American Commission was followed by the formation of
a Global Commission on Drug Policy, which also included notable
Mexican politicians and scholars. 269 It issued similar findings that
criticized U.S. drug policies for failing to resolve drug violence while
noting the horrific consequences of U.S. strategies. 270 The report
identified Mexico as an example of drug law enforcement practices that
served to increase the violence and corruption associated with the drug
trade:
The available scientific evidence suggests that increasing the intensity
of law enforcement interventions to disrupt drug markets is unlikely
to reduce drug gang violence. Instead, the existing evidence suggests
that drug-related violence and high homicide rates are likely a
natural consequence of drug prohibition and that increasingly
sophisticated and well-resourced methods of disrupting drug
distribution networks may unintentionally increase violence. 271

And in May 2013, the Organization of American States released its
comprehensive report on drug polices, “express[ing] their frustration
with the limits and exorbitant costs of current policies and their hunger
for a fuller, more creative debate.” 272
Ernesto Zedillo has called for an end to the “war on drugs model”
describing such an approach as “nothing short of devastating.” 273 The
former president of Colombia, César Gaviria, who held office during the
worst of that country’s drug wars, called U.S. war on drugs and its drug
polices a “crashing failure [fracaso].” 274 Costa Rica’s president Laura
Chinchilla stated:
because we have no army and we are not willing to be hooked onto
that convoy of destruction, of militarism, of exorbitant expenditure,
that distracts states from their efforts toward social
investment . . . . Costa Rica has already made progress in
decriminalizing drug consumption, [because] we believe it’s a
question of public health, and not of criminal law. 275

See GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG POL’Y, supra note 73.
Id. at 9.
271 Id. at 15 (quoting INT’L CENTRE FOR SCI. DRUG POL’Y, EFFECT OF DRUG LAW
ENFORCEMENT ON DRUG-RELATED VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM A SCIENTIFIC REVIEW 5 (2010),
available at http://www.icsdp.org/Libraries/doc1/ICSDP-1_-_FINAL_1.sflb.ashx) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
272 Randal C. Archibold, Americas Coalition Suggests Marijuana Laws Be Relaxed, N.Y.
TIMES, May 18, 2013, at A7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
273 Ernesto Zedillo, Rethinking the ‘War on Drugs’: Insights from the US and Mexico, VOX
(London) (May 22, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/article/rethinking-war-drugs-insights-us-andmexico.
274 Alma Guillermoprieto, Drugs: The Rebellion in Cartagena, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June 2012,
at 39 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
275 Id. at 40 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
269
270

WEISSMAN.35.4 (Do Not Delete)

2014]

4/10/2014 2:31 PM

REMAKING MEXICO

1513

The government of Uruguay recently announced that it was not
only considering regulating and decriminalizing marijuana as part of its
own security plan but also creating a legal state-managed monopoly for
the transport of drugs as part of what has been described as “a rising
movement in this region to create alternatives to the United States-led
war on drugs.” 276 A Brazilian congressman stated plainly: “[w]e are
trying to distance ourselves from the U.S. model.” 277 Bolivia successfully
demanded amendments to the UN Antidrug Convention because of its
prohibition on the use of the coca plant notwithstanding U.S. objections
to the change. 278 These national leaders have not only expressed
opposition to the U.S. criminalization-style response to drug trafficking,
but some have suggested that they are owed compensation for the
tremendous amount of resources required to invest in such a
response. 279
Notwithstanding the emergence of popular sentiment in favor of
an end to the prototype war on drugs criminalization strategies, the
United States has persisted with its own version of law and order
reforms. 280 U.S. drug law policies have insinuated themselves over the
border by way of trade conditionalities imposed on Mexico that require
it to certify its drug control efforts according to terms defined by the
United States. 281 U.S. officials continue to pressure Mexican and other
Latin American leaders who have proposed an ordered scheme of
276

at A1.

Damien Cave, South America Sees Drug Path to Legalization, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012,

277 Damien Cave, Ask a Question on Drug Policy in Latin America, N.Y. TIMES (July 29,
2012,
10:24
PM),
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/damien-cave-is-takingquestions-on-drug-policy-in-latin-america/?ref=world (internal quotation marks omitted).
278 William Neuman, Bolivia: Morales Wins Victory as U.N. Agrees to Define Some Coca Use
as Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2013, at A7 (noting that Bolivia, which had withdrawn from the
Convention in protest, rejoined after an agreement that allows Bolivians to use the leaves as a
mild stimulant and in various cultural rituals).
279 Guillermoprieto, supra note 274, at 40.
280 LUIS ASTORGA, DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO: A FIRST GENERAL ASSESSMENT 20
(Mgmt. of Soc. Transformations, Disc. Paper No. 36, 1999), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001176/117644Eo.pdf (noting that “[t]he only political
force the Mexican government has ever listened to, in drug matters, is the U.S.A. government”);
Wright, supra note 49, at 368; Boscov-Ellen, supra note 49; Garcia, supra note 44 (noting that
the United States has set the agenda for Mexico’s drug policy); see Oscar Avila, Mexico Weighs
a Change of Focus on Drugs, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2008, at 7 (noting pressure from the United
States on then President Vicente Fox in 2006 while he was considering a proposal to
decriminalize small amounts of drug possession).
281 Jan Rus & Miguel Tinker Salas, Introduction: Mexico 2006-2012: High Stakes, Daunting
Challenges, 33 LATIN AM. PERSP. 5, 14 (2006). But, note that the United States tolerated
Mexico’s drug activity and certified Mexico’s efforts through the 1980s and 1990s for strategic
reasons relating to the need to pass NAFTA. See JORGE HERNÁNDEZ TINAJERO & LEOPOLDO
RIVERA RIVERA, INT’L DRUG POL’Y CONSORTIUM, CANNABIS IN MEXICO, AN OPEN DEBATE
(2010), available at http://idpc.net/sites/default/files/library/Cannabis%20in%20Mexico.pdf;
JOSE LUIS VELASCO, INSURGENCY, AUTHORITARIANISM, AND DRUG TRAFFICKING IN MEXICO’S
“DEMOCRATIZATION” 102–03 (2005).
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legalization of drugs to abandon such pursuits. 282 The United States
rejected plans to debate an alternative to criminalization strategies at the
2012 Summit of the Americas and issued an “official response” signaling
that any effort to decriminalize drugs was “unthinkable.”283 President
Obama is reported to have “flatly ruled out legalizing drugs” in response
to the debate about the Commission’s recommendations despite the
forceful and open positions articulated by Latin American leaders, and
their unprecedented willingness to confront the United States on its
failed criminalization policies.284 Surveys on the issue suggest that most
interviewees believed that the United States has attempted to prevent
Mexicans from fully debating the subject. 285
U.S. efforts to diminish the influence of these reports
notwithstanding, proposals to end the U.S.-style war on drugs continue
to gain ground in Mexico and throughout much of Latin America.
Mexicans are rethinking the legal strategies based on criminalization of
drug use, drug possession, and drug transport. They, with their Latin
American counterparts, have declared that “[t]he foundations of the
U.S.-led war on drugs—eradication of production, interdiction of
traffic, and criminalization of consumption—have not succeeded and
never will.” 286 Surveys demonstrate that Mexican citizens strongly desire
282 Shortly after the release of the Commission’s report, the Mexican Congress enacted
modest legal reforms that legalized the possession of certain drugs in small quantities. Wright,
supra note 49, at 368. President Calderón called for a national debate on the issue of
legalization, but subsequently curtailed his willingness to move forward with such agenda—a
reluctance widely understood as a function of his concern that the United States disapproves of
such a shift. Juan Carlos Hidalgo, Calderón Hints at Drug Legalization Again, CATO INST.
(Sept. 20, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/calderon-hints-at-drug-legalizationagain/; Tim Johnson, In Mexico, Biden Shoots Down Talk of Drug Legalization, MCCLATCHYDC
(Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/03/05/140884/in-central-america-bidenshoots.html; see Randal C. Archibold, U.S. Remains Opposed to Drug Legalization, Biden Tells
Region, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A6 (describing Vice President Biden as issuing a blunt
message); Cave, supra note 44; Garcia, supra note 44 (noting that a move toward legalization
would be an affront to U.S. policy makers that neither Calderón nor his successor, Enrique
Peña Nieto, could afford to make); Guillermoprieto, supra note 274, at 39; Moraff, supra note
261; Mark Stevenson, Amid U.S. Pressure, Mexican President Backs Off Drug Decriminalization
Bill, POLICEONE (May 4, 2006), http://www.policeone.com/drug-interdiction-narcotics/articles/
132451-Amid-U-S-pressure-Mexican-president-backs-off-drug-decriminalization-bill.
283 Guillermoprieto, supra note 274, at 39 (noting that meetings were called in advance of
the Summit and that statements in strong terms were issued by Secretary of Homeland Security
Janet Napolitano, Vice President Joseph Biden, and President Obama).
284 Matea Gold, Obama Says No to Legalizing Drugs: Leaders at the Summit of the Americas
Want to Discuss What They Consider a Failed War, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, at 6; Garcia,
supra note 44; see, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, End the War on Pot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, at
A33. The literature of the war on drugs in the United States is not reviewed in this Article.
285 de las Heras, supra note 260.
286 César Gaviria, Fernando Henrique Cardoso & Ernesto Zedillo, Drugs: The Debate Goes
Mainstream, LATIN AM. BUREAU (May 10, 2012), http://www.lab.org.uk/index.php? option=
com_content&view=article&id=1371:drugs-the-debate-goesmainstream&catid=66: analysis&
Itemid=39; see Randal C. Archibold, Mexico Closely Watches California’s Vote on Legalizing
Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2010, at A6.
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to be more closely involved in the decisions for their country with
regard to changes to its legal system. 287 They have begun to rethink
alternatives that differ from the prototypical U.S. response that
emphasizes punishment and reconsider responses to drug-related
violence. 288
5.

Rule of Law Programs and Sovereignty

While much of the Mérida Initiative’s rule of law program conflicts
with reform efforts initiated by Mexicans themselves, there are some
program provisions that have been promoted by Mexican legal
reformers independent of the U.S. funded project. 289 Indeed, in the past
twenty years, a number of Mexican efforts to improve its legal system
have been comparable to the U.S. rule of law model. 290 Yet even where
there may be concurrence on the substance of particular reforms, many
Mexicans have objected to the Mérida rule of law program. 291 As an
initiative driven by U.S. foreign policy considerations, the rule of law
program threatens to subordinate Mexico’s development of internal
legal norms and structures and thus compromises Mexican sovereignty.
The Mérida Initiative follows an established practice: law reform
efforts that originate from outside the countries where legal changes are
sought. 292 Substantive reforms were directed and coordinated through
an MSI-created entity in Mexico known as Proderecho, whose director
had previously led one of the largest U.S. public relations and lobbying
firms to promote support for NAFTA. 293 USAID has also partnered with
287 Catalina Pérez Correa, Distrust and Disobedience: Discourse and Practice of Law in
México, 77 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 345, 361 (2008).
288 LATIN AM. COMM’N, supra note 265.
289 Langer, supra note 108, at 618.
290 Javier Couso, The Transformation of Constitutional Discourse and the Judicialization of
Politics in Latin America, in CULTURES OF LEGALITY, supra note 148, at 141–42 (noting this is
true for much of Latin America); see Kossick, supra note 158, at 725–27, 778. It should be
noted, however, that many of these reforms were undertaken in large part as a result of pressure
from international financial institutions upon which Mexico has been dependent and the
globalized “free market” economy. Id. at 725–26.
291 INGRAM ET AL., supra note 54, at 12 (noting skepticism about judicial reform as a product
of outside forces, especially the United States); see also COLLEEN W. COOK ET AL., CONG. RES.
SERV., MÉRIDA INITIATIVE: PROPOSED U.S. ANTICRIME AND COUNTERDRUG ASSISTANCE FOR
MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA 6 (2008), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/103694.pdf.
292 BILL ONG HING, ETHICAL BORDERS: NAFTA, GLOBALIZATION, AND MEXICAN
MIGRATION 56 (2010); PÁSARA, supra note 209, at 7.
293 Rodriguez, supra note 220 (describing Proderecho as a USAID funded, MSI-operated
organization); see MATTHEW C. INGRAM ET AL., TRANS-BORDER INST., JUSTICIABARÓMETRO:
SURVEY OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORS, AND PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN NINE MEXICAN STATES 2011, at
99 (2011), available at http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/justiciabarometrojudicial-survey.pdf (noting that Proderecho was created and funded by USAID and then
contracted out to MSI); TAFOYA, supra note 75, at 1 n.1 (noting that Proderecho is the name
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the National Democratic Institute, a U.S.-based entity comprised of U.S.
politicians and political figures, in its endeavor to change Mexico’s legal
system. 294 Casals & Associates, a subsidiary of DynCorp, a Virginiabased entity has lobbied Mexican legislators for constitutional
amendments. 295
Mexican legal professionals, human rights activists, and the media
have protested the USAID’s rule of law program as “made in
America.” 296 In a letter to the U.S. State Department, human rights
organizations admonished the United States for having failed to
establish any meaningful opportunity for citizen participation. 297 They
have criticized USAID’s “Mechanism for Dialogue with Civil Society
Organizations” as a meaningless structure that provides little
opportunity for citizens to contribute to reform initiatives or to evaluate
outcomes. 298 Jurists have complained that the U.S.-initiated reforms
were enacted in a top-down manner without sufficient debate. 299 Local
officials decried the lack of Mérida’s benefits and castigated U.S. efforts
for proposing reforms without a sufficient understanding of the
circumstances. 300 Concern for national sovereignty has driven much of
the criticism of U.S efforts to impose legal reform in Mexico. 301

that the USAID’s Rule of Law project has used since 2004); Araizaga & Diaz, supra note 213, at
2 (describing Lucy Tacher who formerly worked for Burson Marsteller, as “one of the world’s
leading lobbying firms”); Matthew C. Ingram, Trans-Border Inst., State-Level Judicial Reform in
Mexico: The Local Progress of Criminal Justice Reforms (Working Paper, 2010), available at
http://catcher.sandiego.edu/items/peacestudies/Ingram-State%20Level%20Reform.pdf.
294 MGMT. SCIS. FOR DEV., INC., supra note 74, at 13; see NDI Board of Directors, NAT’L
DEMOCRATIC INST., http://www.ndi.org/board_of_directors (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
295 MGMT. SYS. INT’L, supra note 74, at 36–37.
296 Araizaga & Diaz, supra note 213, at 2–3.
297 Conditioned Funds for Mexico Under the Mérida Initiative Should Not Be Released Unless
Concrete Progress Is Made on Human Rights Requirements, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM. (May
26, 2010), http://www.wola.org/news/conditioned_funds_for_mexico_under_the_merida_
initiative_should_not_be_released_unless_concrete [hereinafter Conditioned Funds]; see
Ginger Thompson & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Drones Fly Deep in Mexico to Fight Drugs, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2011, at A1.
298 Conditioned Funds, supra note 297.
299 Reforma Judicial Con Sello Gringo, PROCESO (Mexico City, Mex.) (Feb. 17, 2008),
http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=196798; Patrick Corcoran, Mexico Judicial Reforms Go Easy on
Corrupt Judges, INSIGHTCRIME (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.insightcrime.org/newsanalysis/mexico-judicial-reforms-go-easy-on-corrupt-judges.
300 Joseph Kolb, Ciudad Juarez Mayor Says US Drug War Aid Package Failed His City, FOX
NEWS LATINO (May 24, 2012), http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2012/05/24/ciudadjuarez-mayor-says-us-drug-war-aid-package-failed-his-city.
301 Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Has a New Attitude on U.S.: Obama Will Visit a Nation Said to
Have Grown Far More Wary of American Involvement in its Security Affairs, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2013, at 1 (noting a new wariness on the part of the Mexican government toward U.S.
involvement in Mexico’s security affairs).
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IV. LAWYERS AS TECHNICIANS, LAW AS TECHNICALITIES
As Thomas Carothers has observed, “[t]he rapidly growing field of
rule-of-law assistance is operating from a disturbingly thin base of
knowledge at every level.” 302 USAID and affiliate private contractors
who function as something of a “[r]ule of [l]aw industry” to effect
reforms do so with little regard to past or present except as it infringes
on American needs. 303 “[W]e don’t really know what we are doing,” rule
of law promoters have admitted. 304 Law reform programs generally do
not deviate from a predetermined template driven by what one USAID
Fellow called “extraneous or counterproductive criteria.” 305 Mistakes are
repeated and recycled from one project to another, from one country to
another. 306 USAID contractors boast of numerous contracts with
USAID on rule of law projects throughout the world. 307 Their one-sizefits all model “provides a . . . system of widely accepted rules” and “a
scheme of ordered liberty.” 308 USAID and its contractors
tend to go into the field with a preset number of “deliverables.”
Rather than study the problems in the context of the culture, the
assistance experts arrive with a formula that they are expected to
implement and then are expected to write reports showing that the
deliverables were achieved regardless of whether those
accomplishments furthered the objectives of helping individuals. 309

Carothers, supra note 1, at 13
Mackenzie, supra note 136 (internal quotation marks omitted); see PÁSARA, supra note
209, at 1; Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 15, 2008,
at 12.
304 Economics and the Rule of Law: Order in the Jungle, supra note 303 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
305 LINN HAMMERGREN, USAID GLOBAL CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & GOVERNANCE, FIFTEEN
YEARS OF JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: WHERE WE ARE AND WHY WE HAVEN’T MADE
MORE PROGRESS 14 (2002), available at ftp://pogar.org/LocalUser/pogarp/judiciary/linn2/
latin.pdf; see KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE PROFESSIONALS’ CRITIQUES,
A COMMENTARY ON PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 4
(2006), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/494.pdf (noting that programs are
offered on a take it or leave it basis with little training value); Moliterno, supra note 80, at 770
(describing the negative outcomes from exporting rules of ethics that assume the U.S. approach
fits all).
306 HAMMERGREN, supra note 305.
307 TETRA TECH DPT, NAVIGATING CHANGE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 2, 8 (2011), available at
http://www.tetratechdpk.com/images/stories/Tetra_Tech_DPK_Firm_Capabilities_March_201
1.pdf. DPK is now a division of Tetra Tech ARD and was one of USAID’s top ten contractors in
2008. See CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, Contracts from U.S. Agency for International
Development (FY 2008), FEDSPENDING.ORG, http://www.fedspending.org/fpds/fpds.php?sortp=
r&maj_agency_cat=72&detail=-1&datype=T&reptype=r&database=fpds&fiscal_year=2008&
submit=GO&sum_expand=PAS (last updated July 17, 2012).
308 TETRA TECH DPT, supra note 307, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
309 DAVIDSON, supra note 305, at 5.
302
303
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The Mérida initiative project replicates the dominant model. It
attempts to dissociate law from social and historical context, and instead
markets technical and formalistic assistance in accordance with its “rule
of law orthodoxy.” 310 MSI boasts of projects throughout the globe and
describes training templates that offer the same set of skills without
regard to place or purpose. 311 Checchi Consulting, an MSI
subcontractor on the Mexico rule of law project, similarly advertises a
formulaic global training program for judges and lawyers that appear
oblivious to the possibilities that differences may exist between
Afghanistan and Mexico. 312
An examination of the Mérida Initiative rule of law project sets in
relief the approach of law-as-technicalities. USAID reports set forth
conclusions without evidence, listing the number of individuals trained,
the number of meetings held, name courses and events, and identify
justice reforms without indicating the substance or outcomes of these
activities. 313 Charts lack context and substance; photographs of
professionals at meetings fill the pages of quarterly reports. 314 USAID
proclaims the success of its rule of law project based on numbers of
training events and declares, “[t]he number of events reported above
enumerates the work of USAID/Mexico . . . and demonstrate the
successes of the project in its different phases of moving toward
criminal justice reform in Mexico.” 315 The lack of precise definitions of
terms and the absence of means of measuring outcomes serves to
conceal in technocratic-management language the central premise: the
United States’ determination to remake Mexico’s judicial system to
resemble “our (often fantastical) ideas of our own society.” 316
310 USAID, GUIDE TO RULE OF LAW COUNTRY ANALYSIS: THE RULE OF LAW STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK: A GUIDE FOR USAID DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE OFFICERS 5–15 (2010),
available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnadt593.pdf (generic framework for USAID rule of
law strategies); Upham, supra note 94, at 1 (criticizing rule of law projects that establish “a set
of uniformly enforced, established legal regimes that clearly lays out the rules of the game”); see
Gordon, supra note 95, at 466 (noting that law is a form of political and cultural expression).
311 About Us, MGMT. SYSTEMS INT’L, http://www.msiworldwide.com/about-us (last visited
Mar. 14, 2014) (describing projects in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan, and the Democratic
Republic of Congo). In particular, MSI boasts of rule of law projects in Eastern Europe, the
former Soviet Union, Latin America, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sri Lanka. Practice
Areas, MGMT. SYSTEMS INT’L, http://www.msiworldwide.com/our-work/practice-areas (last
visited Mar. 14, 2014) (click on “Rule of Law”).
312 Access to Justice, CHECCHI & CO. CONSULTING, http://www.checchiconsulting.com/
index.php? option=com_projects&aoe_id=1&Itemid=8#66 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); Mexico,
CHECCHI & CO. CONSULTING, http://www.checchiconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_
projects&country_id=9&Itemid=8. (last visited Mar. 14, 2014); see Mackenzie, supra note 136.
313 See generally MGMT. SCIS. FOR DEV., supra note 74; see also PÁSARA, supra note 209, at 1
(noting lack of proper evaluations).
314 MGMT. SCIS. FOR DEV., INC., supra note 74, at 8–12.
315 Id. at 17.
316 Rory Stewart, The Irresistible Illusion, 31 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3 (2009) (critiquing U.S.
efforts to create a world view); see also Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of
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USAID’s efforts to evaluate its program have not been successful,
even by the superficial standards to which it purports to abide. The
Office of the Inspector General (OIG) determined that USAID/Mexico
failed to provide accurate numbers of individuals it claimed to train;
performance indicators were found “[in]appropriate for measuring
progress.” 317 The OIG noted that USAID did not succeed in delivering
the program specifications: “USAID/Mexico’s technical officers
responsible for the rule of law projects have not effectively carried out all
their responsibilities,” and failed to establish a system for evaluation.318
The GAO similarly reported that USAID failed to develop adequate
performance measures, and noted too that it has been difficult to track
the use of funds. 319 USAID was also found to have violated procurement
regulations in its award of the contract to MSI. 320
These types of findings are not new. For the last two decades,
USAID has failed to provide meaningful evaluations of its rule of law
initiatives. 321 Incomplete and incorrect program assessments as a
chronic condition cannot but invite the inference of deliberate efforts to
conceal failure, and thereby stifle public debate about the efficacy of the
rule of law initiative. 322 Indeed, such strategies rely on a preordained
agenda that fails to produce a coherent set of laws or legal systems and
“insist[s] on the fiction of apolitical” in the realm of the development of
laws. 323
Legal professionals who engage in these projects perform as
technicians and function within what C. Wright Mills called the
“bureaucratic ethos.” 324 They tend to lack connection with or
Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 92, at 253, 282 (describing related phenomena as “justification
for opportunistic behavior”).
317 OFFICE OF THE U.S. INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 1-523-11-001-P, AUDIT OF
USAID/MEXICO’S RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRAM 2, 8, 23 (2012), available at
http://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/audit-reports/1-523-11-001-p.pdf
[hereinafter
OIG
REPORT].
318 Id. at 2, 11.
319 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 70, at 9–10; see also PÁSARA, supra note
209, at 3–4 (describing the difficulty in tracking USAID funds).
320 OIG REPORT, supra note 317, at 2; see H.R. REP. NO. 112-223, at 29 (2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112hrpt223/pdf/CRPT-112hrpt223.pdf.
321 PÁSARA, supra note 209, at 19 (reviewing the U.S. GAO reports’ finding that USAID has
consistently failed to evaluate its rule of law programs throughout Latin America).
322 Riddell, supra note 95.
323 Amichai Magen, The Rule of Law and Its Promotion Abroad: Three Problems of Scope, 45
STAN. J. INT’L L. 51, 96 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see PÁSARA, supra note 209,
at 10 (describing legal transplant efforts as “highly standardized”); Roesler, supra note 92, at
212 (observing that “rule-of-law practitioners” equate the rule of law with institutional
checklists).
324 Roberto González, Embedded, in BESTEMAN, supra note 135, at 97, 113; see Yves Dezalay
& Bryant G. Garth, Law, Lawyers and Social Capital: “Rule of Law” Versus Relational
Capitalism, 6 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 109, 132 (1997) (describing the transformation of lawyers
into technocrats as the equivalent of U.S lawyers).
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responsibility for the social consequences of their efforts to remake the
Mexican judicial system. Legal academics often suspend their critical
analytical abilities. Instead, as Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth have
suggested, they “mobilize on behalf of specific objectives consistent with
their accepted universals” and “rely less on their scientific tools and
more on the authority of the professional expertise or discipline they
represent.” 325 They forge ahead with their projects, often oblivious to the
consequences of their lack of knowledge and frequently ignorant of their
contributions to the problems they presume to remedy. 326 There is little
evidence of thoughtful reflection within the State Department and
USAID, or among U.S. lawyers who participate in this endeavor. 327
CONCLUSION
As Thomas Carothers has observed, “hardly anyone these days will
admit to being against the idea of law.” 328 Without a coherent and
credible system of justice, efforts to establish order, control crime, and
protect human rights are compromised. The rule of law serves as a
means to protect citizens against rights violations and promote orderly
due process. The exchange of legal values among nations may be
beneficial in their own right, but a U.S. rule of law agenda as a (coercive)
foreign policy initiative offers few benefits. Offered in the guise of
promoting democratic changes abroad, rule of law programs are often
little more than a means of political intervention to advance U.S.
interests. 329 These initiatives have been designed to expand the
extraterritorial reach of the United States in the internal affairs of other
countries, promote a neoliberal agenda, and maintain U.S. hegemony in
the hemisphere. 330
325 Dezalay & Garth, supra note 96, at 310. Indeed, law professors may ignore questions and
concerns about the hierarchical construction of law. Id. at 312.
326 DAVIDSON, supra note 305, at 2 (describing the rule of law doctors as promoting
“bureaucratic incompetence and empire building, personal spite and egotistical blindness”); see
Smith, supra note 170, at 387 (describing an exchange between a U.S. lawyer studying Mexican
constitutional law in Mexico, who when criticizing the lack of implementation of individual
protections as demonstrated by the use of torture was reminded that at least Mexicans did not
“fry people in electric chairs” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
327 Smith, supra note 170, at 387.
328 See Carothers, supra note 140, at 99.
329 ARCENEAUX & PION-BERLIN, supra note 99, at 86–87 (reviewing the settled
pronouncements by Latin American historians).
330 Santos, supra note 316, at 255–56; see Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Globalizations, 23
THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 393, 394 (2006) (noting the need for new legal frameworks to
accommodate globalization, liberalization, and market relations); Kathryn Tarker, Too Close for
Comfort: El Salvador Ratchets Up Its U.S. Ties, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (July 20, 2005,
2:36
PM),
http://www.coha.org/too-close-for-comfort-el-salvador-ratchets-up-its-us-ties
(describing the statement of purpose for the development of the International Law
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The Mérida Initiative rule of law program continues a long history
of U.S. efforts to export law. As with other foreign aid programs that
link the export of institution-building programs and “humanitarian
interventions” with military initiatives, the Mérida Initiative blurs the
distinction between compassion and combat. 331 It subsidizes legal
trainings simultaneously with funding of weapon systems and
surveillance technology. Often well-meaning lawyers arrive to Mexico
with Drug Enforcement Administration agents, CIA officials, and
military personnel from the Pentagon’s Northern Command. 332 On the
one hand, the Mérida Initiative has legitimatized violence by financing
the escalation of a militarized response to the war on drugs while, on the
other, it purports to mitigate violence by heightened criminalization
strategies—a conceptual contradiction rejected by most Mexican human
rights advocates. 333
It is difficult, moreover, to justify exporting a system of law that
shares many of the very flaws that the Mérida Initiative rule of law
program claims it seeks to improve. The U.S. criminal justice system
hardly constitutes an ideal model to export—a concern expressed by
Mexicans. 334 They have criticized the Mérida Initiative as a hypocritical
endeavor imposed by a government whose police officials kill Mexican
immigrants and enjoy total impunity (éstos gozan de total libertad). 335
The U.S. legal system suffers from corruption that can hardly be
described as isolated or random. 336
Enforcement Academy by which the United States has sought to assure the functioning of free
markets through rule of law projects).
331 Christopher Caldwell, Communiste et Rastignac, 31 LONDON REV. BOOKS 7 (2009).
332 Ginger Thompson, U.S. Widens Its Role in Battle Against Mexico’s Drug Cartels, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, at A1.
333 See, e.g., WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM., MEXICAN AND U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS
ORGANIZATIONS CALL ON THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO WITHHOLD MÉRIDA INITIATIVE FUNDING
FOR MEXICO (2009), available at http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/
past/July%2016%20PublicStatement_USA_Mexico_NGOS_Merida.pdf.
334 Lacey, supra note 218 (reprinting the language of an editorial in La Jornada describing
U.S. effort to scrutinize Mexico’s armed forces as “‘a grotesque and absurd pretension’” in light
of the United States’ own human rights issues in its detention facility in Guantanamo Bay).
335 Critica CNDH Condiciones de Iniciativa Mérida, TERRA (Mex.) (May 26, 2008, 3:43 PM),
http://www.terra.com.mx/articulo.aspx?articuloId=669198.
336 See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2013, at
SR4 (describing police culture and practices creating incentives for law enforcement to lie
under oath); Assoc. Press, Pennsylvania: Mixed Verdict for Disgraced Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2011, at A16 (describing the scandal whereby judges sentenced youth offenders to for-profit
detention centers in exchange for cash payments of millions of dollars); Fair Courts at Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2010, at A28 (citing to a report with a forward written by retired U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Conner noting that influence peddling in the judiciary
has impaired impartiality); Mandy Locke et al., Scathing SBI Audit Says 230 Cases Tainted by
Shoddy Investigations, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/08/19/635632/scathing-sbi-audit-says-230-cases.html#
storylink=cpy (reporting on the N.C. State Bureau of Investigation which deliberately withheld
or distorted evidence in hundreds of cases involving potentially innocent men and women); see
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There is little evidence that the rule of law program has produced
the desired outcomes and no basis upon which to assume that it will
enhance Mexico’s judicial system. 337 Nonetheless, Congressional
support is mounting for continued funding of the Mérida Initiative with
a focus on the expansion of the rule of law program. 338 A report
prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations claims that “greater
trust” has developed between U.S. and Mexican officials, even while
acknowledging that the effort thus far has been ineffective and that the
day-to-day lives of Mexicans have suffered as a result of an increase in
violence. 339 The report urges U.S. officials to “impress[] upon [Mexicans
officials] the high priority that the U.S. Government assigns to the
reform efforts” and recommends even greater attention to enhancing
the prosecutorial powers of the Mexican Attorney General’s office. 340
The report suggests that the U.S. government take on an active role in
policing (“cooperative law enforcement relationship”) at both the state
and local level that would go beyond training to include the
establishment of task forces. 341
As Dani Rodrik has observed, “[c]ountries have the right to protect
their own social arrangements, regulations, and institutions,” and
further, that “[c]ountries do not have the right to impose their
institutions on others.” 342 Human rights activists in Mexico have
pursued a different rule of law agenda. They have focused on social
inequalities, poverty, and health care as opposed to the war on
crime/drugs motif. 343 Grassroots movements have articulated their
demands: Stop the criminalization model and support locally controlled
community safety programs. 344 Most notably, Mexican citizens have
stated their desire for autonomy in determining the means to end the
drug violence and improve the social fabric of their country:
Matt Smith & Emma Lacey-Bordeaux, U.S. Judge Bought Drugs for Stripper, Feds Say, CNN
(Oct. 4, 2010, 5:45 PM), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-04/justice/georgia.judge.arrested_1_
drug-and-weapons-charges-undercover-agent-federal-agents?_s=PM:CRIME.
337 GUILLERMO ZEPEDA LECUONA, MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM IN MEXICO 6 (2012), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/
files/guillermo_zepeda_lecuona.pdf (USAID sponsored evaluation noting that fewer people are
now held in pre-trial detention).
338 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., JUDICIAL AND POLICE
REFORMS IN MEXICO: ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCKS FOR A LAWFUL SOCIETY 1 (Comm. Print
2012).
339 Id. at 2.
340 Id. at 3–4.
341 Id. at 8 (suggesting that questions pertaining to Mexican sovereignty have been resolved).
342 DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE
WORLD ECONOMY 239–42 (2011).
343 ESTÉVEZ, supra note 151, at 62.
344 Documents of the Movement in Translation: Manifesto the #I Am 132 to the People of
Mexico,
UEINTERNATIONAL
(July
27,
2012),
http://ueinternational.org/MLNA/
mlna_articles.php?id=203#1477 (demanding a change to media, education, the neoliberal
economic model, and the fulfillment of health rights).
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Change in the neoliberal economic model. Experience and history
have convinced us that the market is not a panacea that can solve the
problems of society and government. Society should play a
fundamental role in resolving the economic problems the country
endures. That is why we will fight for a human, just, sovereign,
sustainable and peaceful economy.
Change in the model of national security. In order to restore peace, it
is imperative to withdraw the armed forces from their role as police;
as well as to stop the criminalization, repression and harassment of
social protest and the population in general. . . . At the same time, we
support autonomous community safety programs and organization
against mega-projects. . . .
We embrace the voice of social organizations and movements,
connecting ourselves in solidarity in the search of alliances that are
based on respect for autonomy, the construction of a horizontal
relationship, and we recognize ourselves with humility as one of
many social actors expressing social discontent. 345

These demands do not resemble the elements of USAID’s rule of law
program.

345

Id.

